Economic Aggression & Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto by Dempsey, Paul Stephen
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2
1977
Economic Aggression & Self-Defense in
International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and
Alternative American Responses Thereto
Paul Stephen Dempsey
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Paul Stephen Dempsey, Economic Aggression & Self-Defense in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American
Responses Thereto, 9 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 253 (1977)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol9/iss2/3
1977]
Economic Aggression & Self-Defense in
International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon
and Alternative American
Responses Thereto*
by Paul Stephen Dempsey**
CONTENTS
I. Introduction ................................................ 254
II. The Fact Situation: Strangulation
and the Arab Oil Weapon ................................. 256
A. The Nation-State Petroleum Cartels:
OPEC & OAPEC ...................................... 256
B. The Impending Crisis ................................... 258
C. Yom Kippur and the Arab Oil Embargo: RIP ............. 259
III. Economic Coercion as Aggression ............................ 261
A. The Intent of the Actors ................................ 261
B. The United Nations System ............................. 263
1. U.N. Resolutions and Declarations ..................... 263
a. Economic Restraint: Aggression,
Coercion and Friendly Relations ................. 263
b. Economic Freedom: Pre- and Post-
Embargo Resolutions ............................ 268
2. The U.N. Charter .................................... 269
C. Customary International Law ............................ 271
1. The Customary International Practice of States:
The American Example ............................. 271
2. The Customary Wartime Practice of States ............. 273
* The author would like to express his sincerest appreciation to former Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk, Professor of International Law, The University of
Georgia, and Professor W. T. Mallison, Jr., The George Washington University,
for reviewing prior drafts of this article and for providing invaluable con-
sultative assistance in the preparation thereof. The opinions expressed herein,
however, are those of the author only, and should not necessarily be attributed
to these outstanding legal scholars. Copyright © 1977 by Paul Stephen Dempsey.
** Attorney-Advisor, Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington, D.C.;
A.B.J., University of Georgia, 1972; Free University of Brussels, 1974; The
Hague Academy of International Law, 1974; J.D., University of Georgia, 1975.
The author is presently enrolled as a Master of Laws candidate in International
Law at George Washington University. The opinions expressed herein are
those of the author only, and should by no means be construed as opinions held
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, or by any other governmental agency.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
3. The Customary Practice of International
Organizations ...................................... 275
4. Customary Self-Defense:
Necessity & Proportionality ......................... 276
D. Conventional International Law ......................... 277
1. The Relevant Multilateral Conventions:
GATT & VCOT ................................... 277
2. The Relevant Bilateral Treaties: FCM .................. 280
IV. U.S. Retaliatory Alternatives ................................ 281
A. Domestic Conservation and
Alternative Energy Sources ............................. 281
B. Diplomatic and Political Remedies ....................... 287
C. Economic Reprisals ..................................... 292
D. Surreptitious Internal Involvement ....................... 299
E. Military Intervention: The Last Resort ................... 299
1. Invasion and Occupation .............................. 299
2. Legal Limitations on the Use of Force .................. 304
3. National Self-Defense Under Article 51 ................ 306
4. The Customary International Law of Self-Defense ...... 310
V. The Long-Term Implications ................................. 314
A. Emerging Petropolitics .................................. 314
B. The Massive Shift of Wealth to
Arab Nations ........................................... 317
C. Cartelization in the Third World ........................ 319
I. INTRODUCTION
0 F ALL THE CONFLICTS on the face of this small planet
[having a possibility of escalation into global warfare], the
region that has the greatest potential of leading the world's major
powers into direct (and possibly nuclear) confrontation is the Mid-
dle East. Since World War II, a sea of blood has washed the
sands of Sinai, Golan, Gaza and the West Bank in a continuing
conflict which is ostensibly religious, unquestionably territorial and
arguably ad infinitum. The inability of both Jews and Arabs to
peacefully determine the future of Palestine has led to a deepen-
ing sense of insecurity in the entire world community - fears
which become more acute as the conflict draws the Great Powers
toward a direct confrontation.' In recent years, restraint on the
'Murphy, The Middle East Crisis, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 390 (1970). See
Neuman, The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Legal Issues and Possible Solutions, 4 INT'L
LAW. 360 (1970); Wright, The Middle East Problem, 4 INT'L LAW. 364 (1970);
Dinstein, The Arab-Israeli Crisis: Legal Issues and Possible Solutions, 4 INT'L LAW.
374 (1970); Bassiouni, The Middle East In Transition: From War to War, A Pro-
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part of industrialized nations entered the arena of economics as
Arab nations directly confronted the West with devastating em-
bargoes on the export of petroleum and incredible increases in the
price of oil. The aggressive manipulation of the region's primary
natural resource, petroleum, has had such a significantly detri-
mental economic effect upon the world's industrialized nations as
to raise the possibility of military intervention.
October of 1973 brought war again to the Middle East, with
an Arab military assault upon Israeli forces on Yom Kippur.
That same month, the economic stability of the world's industrial-
ized nations (which had theretofore grossly underestimated the
vast economic significance of the Arab oil weapon) was severely
threatened when Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) utilized oil as a political weapon,
and embargoed exports of petroleum for five long months. An-
other substantial economic blow was struck by OPEC with mas-
sive increases in the price of oil, from $2.10 per barrel on October 1,
1973, to well over $10.00 per barrel today.
This note shall attempt to provide an analysis of the interna-
tional legal implications of the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74,
and the entire range of retaliatory responses which the United
States might conceivably employ should a future embargo of pe-
troleum be initiated. The first portion of this note will endeavor
to analyze the question of whether the Arab oil embargo was a
legal employment of economic force.2 The latter portion of this
posed Solution, 4 INT'L LAW. 379 (1970); Bassiouni & Fisher, The Arab-Israeli Con-
flict - Real and Apparent Issues: An Insight into its Future From the Lessons of the
Past, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 399 (1970); Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "Para-War"
and Peace in the Middle East, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 466 (1970).
2 See Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon - A Threat to International
Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974), who argue, "The Arab strategy constitutes
the deliberate employment of an economic instrument of coercion (the oil
"weapon") against other States and peoples in order to place intense pressure
upon their freedom of choice. Although this strategy is primarily dependent
upon the use of an economic instrument of coercion, the full dimension of the
coercive process has involved the interrelated use of diplomatic and ideological
instruments as well as the coordinate use of military forces against the State of
Israel. As such, the Arab oil embargo is in violation of international law, as
formulated in the United Nations Charter and key supporting documents."
Id. at 412. "-The United Nations, for example, could declare that there has
been a violation of those provisions dealing with the use of coercion, the pro-
motion of friendly relations, the promotion of self-determination, the promotion
of equal rights of nations large and small, the promotion of social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom, the peaceful settlement of disputes,
and the maintenance of international peace and security. In certain situations,
the use of any economic coercion could constitute a form of 'economic ag-
gression.' And where the impact of economic coercion upon the target group
1977]
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article will attempt to determine what types of American retalia-
tory measures would be justifiable under existing principles of in-
ternational law in response to a future Arab oil embargo and the
resultant economic strangulation which could conceivably result.3
II. THE FACT SITUATION:
STRANGULATION AND THE ARAB OIL WEAPON
A. The Nation-State Petroleum Cartels: OPEC & OAPEC
Abderrahman Khene, the former Secretary-General of
OPEC, 4 has stated that the cartel was created "as a means of self-
defense" against unilateral price decisions made collectively by
privately owned multinational oil-companies with respect to the
natural resources of its member States. Prior to 1960, these in-
ternational corporations held almost absolute control over both the
flow and the price of oil.In 1948, the posted price of oil was established by the com-
panies at $2.17 per barrel. This price was gradually and unilater-
results in intense fear or anxiety (not at all demonstrable in this case),
the use of economic coercion could constitute a form of impermissible terroristic
strategy." Id. at 413, 414. See contra, Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil:
Its Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1974), who asserts, "Far
from being a 'weapon for blackmailing the West' or a 'threat to international
peace'; it has been employed as an instrument for the respect and promotion
of the rule of law in an area of international relations where such a rule has
long been forsaken for the rule of superior military force. In either use of that
instrument, Arab oil-exporting' countries were in fact following the steps of a
great number of other States which have used their export regulations to further
their foreign policies. Only the objective of the Arab States seems to have
been more legitimate. The Arab States took that measure not to weaken
unfriendly countries but merely to discourage third countries from violating
their obligations of neutrality toward them and from continuing their en-
couragement of, or their acquiescence in, an illegal situation." Id. at 625, 626.
3 Certainly, legal factors should not be the sole determinant of policy-
making in any area of political importance, any more than militaiy, economic,
or other factors ought to be the sole determinant. Legal issues should, how-
ever, be an integral part of the decision-making process. Ehrlich, The Legal
Process in Foreign Affairs: Military Intervention - a Testing Case, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 637, 641 (1975).
4 OPEC consists of the following 12 States: Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq,
Indonesia, Kuwait, Liberia, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emir-
ates and Venezuela. Canada is the only major Western exporter which is not
an OPEC member. The dozen OPEC nations account for 85 percent of all the
oil which moves in foreign commerce. These countries produce 54 percent of
all the oil in the world and hold 64 percent of the earth's currently proven re-
serves. OPEC is rapidly becoming the world's most powerful cartel, control-
ling the price and supply of a commodity which is the life blood of industrialized
societies, and vital to food production. OPEC's Oil and Money Machine: How
It Works, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 28, 1974, at 37, 38.
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ally reduced by the oil companies to $1.80 by August of 1960.
The controlling multinational corporations asserted that these re-
ductions were required because of excessive world supply and a
need to remain competitive in Japanese and European markets.
On the other hand, the oil-producing nations viewed these price
reductions as a threat to their own economic independence and
development, inasmuch as the taxes and royalties imposed upon
the posted price had previously been their principal sources of
income.S
Thus, OPEC was founded in 1960. Its initial purposes were:
(a) to reverse the price reduction which the controlling corpora-
tions had instituted as a result of overcapacity; 6 and (b) to defend
and stabilize the oil price structure which then existed. 7 It was
originally established as a movement de resistance against arbitrary
and unilateral decisions by the major oil companies. It exists
,today as an association of nations dedicated to the protection of
their national interests in the production and exportation of oil.s
OPEC :was viewed by its members as an organization having
economic goals. Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, several
Arab States felt that an additional organization should be created
which would employ petroleum resources as a political weapon to
achieve Arab goals vis-c-vis Israel. Consequently, the Organiza-
tion of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was cre-
ated in 1968. 9
OAPEC was established to enable the oil-producing nations
to present a united front to both the multinational petroleum
corporations and the consuming nations. Its politico-economic
nature was characterized by Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Baki
5 Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United
States Antitrust and Public International Law, 9 INT'L LAW. 617, 618 (1975).
6 Muir, The Changing Legal Framework of International Energy Management, 9
INT'L LAW. 605, 607 (1975).
7 A study for the special committee of the U.S. House Banking and Cur-
rency Committee concluded that the price cuts of 1959 and 1960 imposed by
the oil companies triggered the formation of OPEC. OPEC's Oil and Money
Machine: How it Works, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 28, 1974, at 37.
s Amuzegar, OPEC in the Context of the Global Power Equation, 4 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 221 (1974). The history and development of OPEC is analyzed
in Mirvahabi, Claims to the Oil Resources in the Persian Gulf: Will the World Economy
Be Controlled by the Gulf in the Future? 11 TEx. INT'L L. J. 75 (1976). Recent
dissension by certain OPEC nations over what the price of petroleum should
be has created severe economic and political strains within the organization.
See The Strain on OPEC, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1977, at 46.
9 Supra note 5, at 619.
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Yamini as "making oil a genuine weapon to serve the interest of
the producing countries and the Arab countries in general."10
B. The Impending Crisis
The United States government could not reasonably contend
that the oil embargo of 1973 was an entirely unforseen modus
operandi of the Persian Gulf States. The short-lived embargo
placed on shipments of petroleum to the United States during
the Six-Day War" should have been ample warning for OAPEC's
action at Kuwait.
Typical of the rhetoric produced by Arab leaders prior to the
implementation of the embargo was this declaration made in an
international seminar on "Oil as a Weapon" which was held in
Baghdad during November of 1972:
Arab oil can and should be used against the imperialist ag-
gression and occupation, for the liberation of Arab occupied
territory and the restoration of the national rights of the Pal-
estinian people, particularly the right of self-determination.2
In a study prepared prior to the October 1973 embargo for the
U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, it was
expressly forseen that:
The growing proportion of total U.S. energy supply coming
from foreign sources, or from particular regions, blocs or coun-
tries, magnifies the potential impact on the U. S. economy from
a variety of contingencies including wars or international politi-
cal confrontations and insurrection or sabotage in the produc-
ing regions. Moreover, the recent effectiveness of the cartel
of petroleum exporting countries and explicit threats by many
of them, have raised the chilling possibility of a general or
selective embargo by the Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries (OPEC), all the Arab countries, or some other
large bloc of exporters to enforce their economic or political
demands. To offset or deter any of these contingencies, the
10 G. STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST OIL 459 (1970). See Boorman, Economic Coer-
cion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Ensuing Juridical Issues, 9
J. INTL L. & ECON. 205 (1974).
11 Boorman, supra note 10, at 207. That effort lasted from June 4 to August
29, 1967, and was aborted due to the tremendous loss of revenues to Arab oil-
producing States and the negligible effect upon the United States. However, in
1973, increased demand by consuming States and effectively concerted action
which precluded most transshipments, combined with the unavailability of
alternative sources in required quantities, operated to make the oil embargo a
highly effective political and economic weapon. Id. at 207-208.
12 THE PERMANENT SECRETARIAT OF THE AFRo-ASIAN PEOPLES' SOLIDARITY
ORGANIZATION, OIL AS A WEAPON 25 (1972).
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United States currently has neither a significant reserve of pro-
ducing capacity relative to the current or expected volume of
imports (as it had during earlier Middle East crises) nor signif-
icant oil storage capacity.13
In August of 1973, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia emphasized
that although his government did not want to "place any re-
striction on our oil exports to the United States . . . America's
complete support of Zionism against Arabs makes it extremely dif-
ficult for us to continue to supply U.S. petroleum needs and
even to maintain our friendly relations with the United States."'14
C. Yom Kippur and the Arab Oil Embargo: RIP
On October 6, 1973, a number of Arab States launched an
armed attack upon Israeli forces situated in territory which had
been seized by Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967.15 Within
24 hours, the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization requested an immediate cessation of the production
of all Arab oil. Three days after the outbreak of hostilities,
Kuwait called an emergency meeting of Arab oil ministers for a
discussion of "the role of oil in light of current developments."16
On October 15, the U.S. Department of State announced that
the United States had begun to resupply Israel with military
equipment.' 7
On October 17, 1973, 11 days after the fourth Arab-Israeli
war erupted, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OAPEC), meeting in Kuwait, decreed the imposition
of oil embargoes and cutbacks in an effort to support the Arab at-
13 The study was not, however, released until after October of 1973.
A. TUSSING, TOWARD A RATIONAL POLICY FOR OIL AND GAS IMPORTS 4 (1973).
Compare B. BRODIE, FOREIGN OIL AND AMERICAN SECURITY (1947).
14 Quoted in Boorman, supra note 10, at 205-206.
15 See Black October: Old Enemies at War Again, TIME, Oct. 15, 1973, at 30;
The War of the Day of Judgment, TIME, Oct. 22, 1973, at 28; The Mideast Erupts,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 1973, at 38.
The Yom Kippur War was the costliest and most dangerous military engage-
ment in 25 years of Middle East tension. Winding Up War, Working Toward
Peace, TIME, Nov. 5, 1973, at 37. In 18 days of ferocious fighting, as many as
7,700 Egyptians, 7,700 Syrians and 4,500 Israelis were killed or wounded - thelargest number of casualties for all three nations in any war since 1948. Brilliant
Moves in Final Battle, TIME, Nov. 5, 1973, at 44.
16 Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International
Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591, 592 (1974).
17 On October 19, President Nixon requested that Congress appropriate$2,200 million for the current fiscal year in military assistance to Israel. Id.
at 594.
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tempt to regain territory lost to Israel during the 1967 conflict.
These Arab nations agreed: (a) to reduce overall production by at
least 5 percent, with an escalation of an additional 5 percent for
each succeeding month until all Israeli forces had been withdrawn
from Arab territories, (b) to embargo all exports of petroleum to
the United States, and (c) to reward "friendly" nations by as-
suring them of continued petroleum supplies at their monthly
averages for the first 9 months of 1973.
Meeting again in Kuwait on November 4, 1973, Arab utiliza-
tion of the oil weapon was expanded to a 25 percent cutback in
production with an additional 5 percent scheduled for December 1
and every month thereafter until Arab political demands had been
satisfied.18
In accordance with their decision, Abu Dhabi, Algeria and
Libya ceased shipment of the 520,000 barrels a day which they
had previously sold to the United States. Saudi Arabia cut off
600,000 barrels a day to the United States. Previously, six Persian
Gulf States had broken off negotiations with Western oil com-
panies and increased the posted price of oil by 70 percent.
19
In a communiqu6 issued on December 8, the Arab oil min-
isters expressed a willingness to lift the oil embargo against the
United States with the beginning of the implementation of a sched-
ule of withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied
since 1967.10
On March 18, 1974, 5 months after the initiation of the em-
bargo by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhab-i, most of the Arab States,
meeting in Vienna, announced their intention to terminate the oil
embargo against the United States and certain other countries.
21
18See Unsheathing the Political Weapon, TIME, Oct. 29, 1973, at 46; Bennsky,
Department Testifies on Arab Oil Embargoes, 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 770 (1973).
Of the 10 member states of OAPEC, only Iraq refused to abide by these
recommendations. M. ISKANDAR, THE ARAB OIL QUESTION 1 (2nd ed. 1974).
Four of the largest producers (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Algeria and Qatar)
decreed immediate reductions of 10 percent. Still Tightening the Blockage,
TIME, Nov. 5, 1973, at 55.
19 THE EcONOMIST, Oct. 20, 1973, at 66. Boorman, supra note 10, at 207. 16
MIDDLE EAST EcoN. SURVEY, No. 52, Oct. 19, 1973, at i.
3) Supra note 16, at 596.
21 Iraq refused to attend' the Vienna meeting, and Libya and Syria refused
to lend their "assent" to the lifting of the embargo or to any increase in overall
production. Moreover, Algeria indicated that it was only lifting the embargo
temporarily, until June 1. Additionally, it was not decided that the oil embargo
against Denmark, The Netherlands, Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa should
be ended. Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon - A Threat to International
Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410, 412 (1974).
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III. ECONOMIC COERCION AS AGGRESSION
A. The Intent of the Actors
It is not to be doubted that a great deal of economic activity
initiated by a State in the interest of optimizing its economic self-
interests causes a concomitant injury to the economic values held
by other States.2 The structure of the world economic system
contains inherent inequities which cause unavoidably detrimental
consequences to innocent participants. The economic laws by
which international trade and commerce are governed bestow
wealth upon some nations and poverty upon others.
It does not appear desirable to constrain all forms of per-
suasive activity initiated by one State over another, for in an
interdependent -world it is necessary (or, indeed, vital as a sanction-
ing device in international law) that States be permitted to ex-
ercise some measure of influence over the policies and conduct of
their neighbors in the world community. It does appear desirable,
however, in an efficient system of world public order, that forms
of coercive activity, which might be unnecessarily or unreasonably
destructive to the essential values of an innocent target State, or
which might significantly endanger international peace and se-
curity, be effectively regulated or even prohibited.
These types of inevitable economic injury are to be sharply
distinguished from various types of intentional injury which have
been utilized in various degrees by States intending to wage eco-
nomic warfare. The latter includes, but by no means is limited
to: (a) Freezing a target's assets; (b) imposing import and export
embargoes; (c) blacklisting foreign firms and individuals who
deal with the target; (d) reducing foreign supplies by preclusive
purchasing; (e) manipulating foreign exchange markets; (f) with-
drawing or refusing credit; and (g) creating artificial scarcity
and high prices. 23
Perhaps an appropriate consideration which might lend some
assistance to the determination of whether various economic mea-
sures employed by a State should or should not be considered
illegal per se is that which has been suggested by Professor
Bowett - whether the action taken by the involved State can be
attributed to an improper motive or intent. 24  A determination
22 See also M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER 197 (1961).
23 See M. McDOUGAL & Assoc., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 266
(1964).
24 See Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L.
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that the predominant purpose of the acting State was to cause an
illegitimate deprivation or destruction of values of the target State,
rather than a virtuous attainment of ends (that is, maximization
of legitimate values) might be considered as prima facie or even
conclusive evidence of illegality. Thus, the mens rea of the
OAPEC actors shall now be examined in an effort to determine
their culpability.
The avowed purpose of the partial embargo and production
cutbacks of October 1973 as expressed at the initiation thereof
was "the liberation of the Arab territories occupied in the 1967
War and the recovery of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people in accordance with the United Nations resolutions." '
Upon termination of these coercive economic measures, the
Vienna communiqu6 emphasized that their primary purpose had
been "to draw the attention of the world to the Arab cause in
order to create the suitable political climate for the implementa-
tion of Security Council Resolution 242 which calls for the com-
plete withdrawal from the Arab-occupied territories and for the
restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."26
It is argued by the Arabs that not only did the 1967 Israeli
attack upon Arab forces constitute an illegal military aggression,
but the occupation by Israel of the Sinai Peninsula, the West
Bank of the Jordan River and the Golan Heights of Syria since
the war also represents a continuous infringement upon the terri-
torial sovereignty of the partially-occupied States, and thereby
constitutes illegal conquest.
Resolution 242, proposed by Great Britain and adopted unani-
mously by the Security Council in November 1967, emphasizes
"the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war" and
calls upon the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from terri-
tories occupied in the recent conflict." The implementation of
this resolution was an express objective of both the Arab attack
upon Israeli forces in October of 1973 and the Arab oil embargo.
The U.N. system requires that States utilize peaceful means
to accomplish legitimate ends, at least in the first instance, and
1, 5 (1972). Professor Bowett suggests that three types of economic coercion
could readily be classified as illegal (economic coercion in violation of (a)
specific treaty commitments, (b) general principles of international law, or (c)
the principles of non-intervention). Id. at 2-3.
21 17 MIDDLE EAST ECON. SURVEY, No. 4, Nov. 16, 1973, at iii. This resolu-
tion of 17 October 1973, is quoted in full in Shihata, sipra note 16, at 593. See
also Mc Peak, Israel: Borders and Security, 54 Fo. AFF. 426 (1976).
a, 17 MIDDLE EAST EcON. SURVEY, No. 22, Mar. 22, 1974, at 1, 6.
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the involved Arab States had tried in vain for 6 years to regain
allegedly illegally occupied territory. It has been argued, that:
Governmental action taken by a State within its own terri-
tory for the restoration of legal order disrupted by unautho-
rized acts of others certainly falls within the inherent territorial
jurisdiction of each sovereign State. Although such action may
be based on the exercise of the State's traditional right to self-
help under customary international law or under a broad read-
ing of the U. N. Charter provisions on self-defense, one need
not argue the relevance of such concepts in regards to the Egyp-
tian and Syrian measures. The denial to Egypt and Syria, in
the particular circumstance of the situation, of the right to
take individual or collective action would have resulted in fact
in depriving them indefinitely of their essential right to terri-
torial integrity, guaranteed by the U. N. Charter. Without
such a right, state jurisdiction, let alone sovereignty, would
be nothing but a sham. This obviously explains the fact that
not a single state or international organization has character-
ized the Egyptian and Syrian measures of October 1973 as
illegal or even unwarranted.27
Although the Declaration on Friendly Relations contains cer-
tain prohibitions with respect to the unrestrained employment of
economic coercive measures (see discussion below), it neverthe-
less provides that:
The territory of a State shall not be the object of military
occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of
the provisions of the Charter. The territory of a State shall
not be the object of acquisition by another State resulting from
the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition resulting
from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal.28
B. The United Nations System
1. U. N. Resolutions and Declarations
a. Economic Restraint: Aggression, Coercion
and Friendly Relations
It is inevitable that, in an attempt to assert legal control over
the use of force in the settlement of disputes between nations,
members of the international community should strive to define
the word "aggression." During the last 50 years, numerous un-
successful attempts have been made by both the League of Na-
27 Supra note 16, at 607-608.
28 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970).
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tions and the United Nations to arrive at an acceptable defini-
tion. 29  Today, the concept may be of enormous importance
under Articles 39 and 51 of the U. N. Charter.
The term "economic aggression" was employed as early as
1916 by the British delegation at the Paris Conference in the draft-
ing of a resolution calling for joint action after the war by the Al-
lies to protect their economic interests against German "economic
aggression" by "necessary measures of self-defense. " 3  More
recently, a rather vague definition of aggression formulated by
Bolivia provides:
. ..unilateral action whereby a state is deprived of economic
resources derived from the proper conduct of international trade
or its basic economy is endangered so that its security is af-
fected and it is unable to act in its own defense or to cooperate
in the collective defense of peace shall likewise be deemed to
constitute an act of aggression.31
The Soviet Union has favored a comprehensive, enumerative
definition of aggression specifically providing that economic
aggression is committed whenever a State ". . . takes against
another State measures of economic pressure violating its sover-
eignty and economic independence and threatening the bases of
its economic life" or "subjects another State to an economic
blockade."32 These formulations recognize the principle that, as
world trade expands and economic interdependencies flourish, a
concurrent growth in the vulnerability of States to economic co-
ercion arises. With the development and refinement of methods
of economic warfare, the flow of goods in the international arena
Piper, The Legal Control of the Use of Force and the Definition of Aggres-
sion, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (Supp. 1) (1972); Engel & Taulbee, Discussion
on the Problem of Defining Aggression, 2 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 39 (Supp. I) (1972).
The historical development may be traced in the following publications: Report
of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 7 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes (Agenda Item 54) 17, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952); 5 M. WHITE-
MAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 719-873 (1965).
30 D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 106 (1958).
31 Article 16 of the Charter of the Organization of American States provides,
"No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an economic
or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another State and
obtain from it advantages of any kind." Signed at Bogota, 30 April 1948;
entered into force 13 December 1951. Pan-Am T.S. No. 23; 119 U.N.T.S. 48-92.
Revised as Article 19 by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, 27 February 1967. Pan-
Am T.S. No. 1-B; OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser. A/2, Add. 2 (1967) 1-58.
3 Report of the 1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Ag-
gression, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 30, U.N. Doc. A/3574 (1957).
See Piper, supra note 29, at 9. Soviet Union, Draft Resolution, 18 October
1954, A/C.6/L.332/Rev. 1; GAOR, Annexes (IX) (No. 51), at 6-7.
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can conceivably be so managed as to inflict a significant mea-
sure of coercion upon a target State. 33 Nowhere has this prin-
ciple been more clearly demonstrated than in the 5 month Arab
embargo of petroleum, which so substantially disrupted the econ-
omy of the industrialized world that thinking people were forced
to contemplate the very real threat that without fuel the wheels of
international industry would grind to a halt.
The U.N. General Assembly has, on a number of occasions,
condemned economic means of coercion. For example, the U. N.
Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention expressly provides:
"No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind."34
The Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind specified that: "The intervention by the authorities
of a State in the internal or external affairs of another State, by
means of coercive measures of an economic or political character
in order to force its will and thereby obtain advantages of any
kind." '  The U.N. General Assembly's Declaration of the Prin-
ciples of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States, which is generally viewed as its most
authoritative declaration of contemporary international law,
emphasizes "the duty of states to refrain in their international re-
lations from military, political, economic or any other form of
coercion aimed against the political independence or territorial
integrity of any state . . ." It specifically declares that:
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, politi-
cal or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order
to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sov-
ereign rights and to secure from it the advantages of any
kind)6
Article (2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights of 1966 provides that the disposal of natural
33 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 22, at 196.
' G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 12, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965).
35 Adopted by the International Law Commission, 28 July 1954. 9 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954).
3 G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970). See also G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 12, U.N.
Doc. A/6220 (1965); G.A. Res. 3016, 27 U.N. GAOR (1972); G.A. Res. 3171,
28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
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wealth and resources must not prejudice "any obligation arising
out of international economic co-operation, based on the principle
of mutual benefit, and international law," and "[i]n no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." 37
Indeed, economic aggression may be as detrimental to a State's
security and, if illegal, as dangerous a violation of a State's essen-
tial rights as the use of force.38 It would seem that no inherent
reason exists why the economic policies of a State should not
be considered as aggression if in fact they endanger international
peace and security. 39
Nevertheless, the majority of Representatives to the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly and in the Special Com-
mittees of 1953 and 1956 on the question of defining aggression
have apparently assumed that the right of self-defense is re-
stricted to a riposte to the use of force and that forcible action
cannot be a lawful reaction to economic aggression. 40 The reluc-
tance surrounding its inclusion in a definition of aggression ap-
parently stems from the fears that the Security Council would
have been given unlimited power under Article 39 to label various
forms of non-military coercive conduct as aggression, 41 and that
States might assert the right of self-defense under Article 51 to
justify the utilization of armed force in order to repel infringe-
ments upon their economic values. As to the former anxiety,
it must be recognized that a multitude of coercive alternatives
exist which do not fall within the war-peace dichotomy but
which may nevertheless have economic, social and political
consequences unfortunately similar to those of armed interven-
tion. It might, therefore, be desirable for the Security Council
to possess some measure of latitude in determining that various
forms of non-military coercive conduct constitute aggression. As
to the fear that its inclusion "might suggest the right to go to
war in self-defense" against "economic aggression,"42 such con-
37 Paust & Blaustein, supra note 21, at 422.
3 Supra note 30, at 24.
39 Id. at 261. One of the primary purposes of the United Nations is the
maintenance of international peace and security. See U.N. Charter art. 1,
para. 1.
40I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 254-55
(1963).
41 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, 9 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 11) 9, 10, U.N. Doc. A/2638 (1953).
42 See McDougal & Feliciano, Legal Regulation of Resort to International Coer-
cion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L. J. 1057, 1115
(1959).
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duct would appear to be circumscribed by the established pre-
requisites to the exercise of self-defense under customary inter-
national law: (a) Actual necessity, and (b) proportionality in
responding coercion. 43  It would seem that such limitations
would place an onerous burden upon a State attempting to pro-
vide a legal justification for the utilization of military means in
response to economic coercion. (See discussion below.)
Moreover, at least one authority vigorously opposes the con-
siderable emphasis which has been placed on the interrelation
of the concepts of aggression and self-defense - an emphasis
which supports the theory that aggression gives rise to the right
of self-defense. Professor Bowett argues that the concept of
military aggression is entirely too limited for there to be any real
correlation between a definition of aggression and a definition
of self-defense based upon the need to protect the security of a
State against forms of illegal conduct other than the employ-
ment of military force. 44 The purpose of the concept of aggres-
sion, he asserts, is to define the circumstances in which the
competent organs of the collective security system will take
action to maintain international peace and security; while the
concept of self-defense defines situations in which a State may
employ forceful means to protect those essential rights upon which
its security depends.45 "It is submitted that in considering
whether a situation affords a State the right of self-defense the
only relevant concept is that of self-defense; the concept of
aggression, as it has been elaborated during the course of the
last forty years, has an entirely different purpose and can afford
no guide to the question of whether a right of self-defense
exists. "46
Thus, the fact that economic coercion has not been accepted
within the definition of aggression for the purpose of organs of in-
ternational security bears no relation to the question of whether,
against such indirect forms of highly injurious conduct, the in-
dividual State whose own security is endangered has the legal
right to resort to self-defense. 47
43 Supra note 33, at 195-196.
44 Supra note 30, at 250.
45 Id. at 256.
46 Id. at 261.
47 See supra note 30, at 261.
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b. Economic Freedom: Pre- and Post-Embargo Resolutions
The exclusive control by a State over its natural resources
was recognized in Resolution 1803 of the General Assembly which
provided: "The right of peoples and nations to permanent sov-
ereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exer-
cised in the interest of their national development and of the
well-being of the people of the state concerned." 48  The General
Assembly reaffirmed and extended this principle subsequent to
the initiation of the Arab oil embargo when, on December 12,
1974, it adopted the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States over the vigorous objections expressed by the United States
and certain other industrialized nations. This Charter reflects a
specific bias toward developing States and memorializes the right
of developing countries to engage in concerted action in the dis-
position of their natural resources. 49 For example, Article 5 pro-
vides:
All states have the right to associate in organizations of
primary commodity producers in order to develop their natural
resources to achieve stable financing for their development, and
in pursuance of their aims assisting in the promotion of sus-
tained growth of the world economy, in particular accelerating
the development of developing countries.50
Article 5 reinforces this right by imposing upon States which
are not members of the cartel a duty "to respect that right by
refraining from applying economic and political measures that
would limit it," presumably even if the cartel is guilty of coercion
under international law, and regardless of whether such "mea-
sures" themselves constitute coercion. The last sentence of Article
7 further reinforces this right by imposing upon States a duty
"to cooperate in order to eliminate obstacles that hinder" the
mobilization and utilization by another State of its resources
through any means of its choosing.5'
18 G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(1962); 2 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 223 (1963).
49 Brower & Tepe, Jr., The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A
Reflection or Rejection of International Law? 9 INT'L LAW. 295, 314 (1975).
50 G.A. Res. 3175, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 55, U.N. Doc. A/9030
(1973); The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: Recom-
mendation and Report of the U.N. Second Committee to the General Assembly, 9 INT'L
LAWYER 385, 390 (1975).
51 Supra note 49, at 315.
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2. The U.N. Charter
It is well established that a certain degree of economic coer-
cion is inevitable in a State's day-to-day interaction. Funda-
mental community policy does not seek to prohibit such coercion,inasmuch as it does not appear to pose a significant threat to
the existing system of minimum world public order.52 Articles2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter are deemed by ProfessorsMcDougal and Feliciano to be among the several provisions ofthe Charter which provide a basis for a system of world public
order.S3
Article 2(4) of the Charter requires that all members refrainfrom certain types of impermissible coercion. It provides:
All Members shall refrain in their national relations fromthe threat or use of force against the territorial integrity orpolitical independence of any state, or in any other mannerinconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The question immediately arises as to what types of force are
contemplated by the Article. Is it limited in its applicability to
"armed aggression," or does it apply broadly to cover aggregious
forms of "economic coercion"? Certainly, it must be realized
that various forms of non-military coercion can have at least asdeleterious an effect upon a target State as certain forms of armed
coercion, and thereby constitute as substantial a threat to the
maintenance of international peace and security. Could it havebeen the intent of the framers to permit the former to go totally
unregulated, while concentrating solely upon the latter?
Perhaps the strongest argument for a broad interpretation ofArticle 2(4) is to be found in the language of the provision itself.s4
52 Supra note 33, at 197.
53 Id. at 126-127.
54 For an elaboration of the argument that a broad interpretation shouldbe given the concept of "force" within Article 2(4), and that, in particular, itsdefinition encompasses economic as well as political coercion, we Comment,The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under Article 2(4) of the Charterof the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1974). The argument for anexpansive interpretation of the principles contained in the U.N. Charter in-
cluded the following assertion:
The United Nations Charter has a constitutional character, and it isan axiom of constitution-drafting that the instrument must be imbued
with enough force and clarity to make it effective, and yet haveenough flexibility and expansiveness to ensure against obsolescence.The framers were undoubtedly aware of the possibility that new forms
of international coercion would rise to prominence in future genera-tions. They must also have known that these changes in the complex-
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The framers did not embelish the word "force" with restrictive
adjectives which would have effectively limited its scope. Yet
they could not have been unaware of the inherent vagueness of
the word. Where they intended to restrict its scope, such as in
Article 46, they affirmatively eliminated the patent ambiguities by
utilization of the adjective "armed." 5  It must be emphasized,
however, that the inclusion of economic coercion within the defini-
tion of force in Article 2(4) does not alter the gladiatorial theory
of survival which governs the arena of world trade, so long as
the stakes remain commercial. It is only when a nation under-
takes to utilize its economic power "against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations"
that the norm of Article 2(4) is violated.56
Article 51 of the Charter provides that "Nothing in the pres-
ent Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Mem-
ber of the United Nations . . ."57 Thus, Article 51 retains a
State's inherent right to individually or collectively defend itself
when its fundamental values are threatened by aggression. These
defensive measures are not expressly limited to armed responses,
but may presumably include other forms of responding coercion
(for example, economic embargoes). Thus, when read together,
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter prohibit the threat or utiliza-
tion of force by a State except as authorized by the Charter or
for individual or collective self-defense against another State in
the preservation of political independence or territorial integrity.
ion of international compulsion would in no way diminish its inflam-
matory character or the attending dangers to world peace. The
language of article 2(4) had to be open-ended if it was to remain ef-
fective as a behavioral norm; the history of the United States Constitu-
tion has shown the necessity of formulating new protections for liberty
as new dangers arise. Similarly the Charter of the United Nations
must either permit or even encourage the evolution of norms that are
responsive to new dangers, or be relegated to the status of an irrele- -
vant historical document. Such an event would clearly be repugnant
to the spirit of the Charter and the intention of those who wrote it.
Id. at 999.
55 id. at 997.
56 Id. at 1009.
57 Such defensive measures may continue "until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
U.N. Charter, art. 51. Thus, the Charter recognizes that measures of defensive
self-help may be essential to a State's preservation of values or its very existence
during the interim period before the Security Council has effectively acted un-
der Chapter VII.
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These are circumstances when the utilization of such coercive
measures would have been lawful under pre-existing principles of
customary international law.
C. Customary International Law
It has been traditionally recognized that foreign trade is
exclusively a matter of national sovereignty. International com-
merce has frequently been manipulated in order to advance
foreign policy objectives and to achieve political ends. History
is replete with examples where restrictions upon both imports
and exports have been employed for purposes of exerting diplo-
matic pressure upon a target State.5 8  Professor Eagleton has
asserted: "A state is free to set up almost any barrier to trade and
intercourse against one or all states. She may prohibit trade
entirely, or in certain articles, or with certain states; she may
establish high tariffs against some or all States so far as custo-
mary international law is concerned (though there are many
treaty limitations). s"59 Moreover, it has been observed:
That the regulation of foreign trade is normally a right
within the sovereign prerogatives of an independent country is
too well established to permit disagreement in the context of
existing international law. Individual nations have historically
regulated imports by imposing tariffs, inspections, quantitative
and qualitative restrictions, and numerous other conditions and
barriers to international trade. They have frequently regu-
lated exports as well, including recently, complete cut-offs
where deemed necessary to retain adequate domestic supply
without inflation. The question, then, is whether such regula-
tion becomes illicit when directed against a particular country
or countries for purposes of diplomatic pressure. 60
1. The Customary International Practice of States: The American Example
The economic practices and legislative promulgations of the
United States provide a standard by which to judge the legality
or illegality of the OAPEC embargo.
The United States severed all trade relations with Cuba
following its expropriation in 1961 of all American-owned prop-
58 See also Schwarzenberger, An Evolving Economic World Order? 1 RUT.-CAM.
L.J. 243, 250 (1969).
59 C. EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 86, 87 (3rd ed. 1957).
60 Muir, The Boycott in International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 187, 192
(1974). See also Bowett, supra note 24, at 5.
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erty without compensation. 61  The Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 authorized the President to "establish and maintain a total
embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba,"62
and thereby established the municipal law foundation upon which
President Kennedy based the institution of the embargo on com-
mercial activity between the two nations in February of 1962.63
The U.S. municipal law statutory bases for the manipulation
of economic activity for the achievement of political ends are quite
numerous. 64  For example, United States corporations and their
controlled subsidiaries are prohibited by the Trading with the
Enemy Act of 1917 from engaging in foreign commercial trans-
actions with certain specified nations during any period of na-
tional emergency declared by the President.65  The Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 prohibits tariff concessions for products
of Communist nations, and permits the President to regulate the
importation of any. commodity deemed to threaten the national
security. 66  The Export Control Act of 1949 declares that the
economic policy of the United States shall be to utilize export
controls in the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and "to
exercise the necessary vigilance over exports from the standpoint
of their significance to national security."67  This Act was re-
61 The Cuban Law No. 851, expropriating all American property in Cuba,
described the U.S. action in amending the Sugar Act of 1948 so as to drastically
reduce the Cuban sugar quota as "aggression, for political purposes, against
the basic interests of the Cuban economy." The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307
F. 2d 845 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), concluded that
the "legislative history made it abundantly clear that the main purpose of the
amendment was to impose a sanction against an unfriendly nation." 307 F.2d
845, 865 (1962). However, it nevertheless determined that "we cannot find
any established principle of international jurisprudence that requires a nation to
continue buying commodities from an unfriendly source." Id. at 866. The U.S.
action, if indeed an economic sanction, may perhaps best be regarded as a re-
prisal against "the discriminatory, aggressive and injurious economic policies
of the Castro regime." Department of State Press Release No. 600 (Oct. 19,
1960), 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 715, 716 (1960). See Bowett, Economic Coercion
and Reprisals By States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1972), and Boorman, supia
note 10, at 226.
62 U.S.C. § 2370 (1961).
63 Pres. Proc. 3477, 3 C.F.R. § 157 (1962).
64 See Shihata, supra note 16, at 609-611, and Muir, supra note 60, at 192-193.
65 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1970), 31 C.F.R. % 500.101-809 (1972). See
Comment, The Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign-Based Subsidi-
aries of American Multinational Corporations: A Time to Abstain from Refraining, 11
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 206 (1973).
66 19 U.S.C. § 1861-62 (1970).
67 Act of February 26, 1949, ch. 11, § 2, 63 Stat. 7; 19.U.S.C. § 2021 (1949).
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placed by the Export Administration Act of 1969 which expressly
affirms the principle that the, United States is "to use its eco-
nomic resources and trade potential . .. to further its national
security and foreign policy objectives," and provides the Presi-
dent not only with power to prescribe regulations governing ex-
ports from the United States, but also to prohibit exportation "to
any nation or combination of nations threatening the national
security of the United States."68 Pursuant to this legislation,
the U.S. Department of Commerce has promulgated export
licensing requirements and virtually eliminated exportation to
Communist nations of certain designated "strategic" com-
modities .69
The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, more
commonly referred to as the Battle Act, emphasizes the policy
of the United States to proscribe the exportation of various
strategic commodities, including petroleum, to nations threatening
U. S. security, including the Soviet Union. 70
Clearly, both the express policy and actual practice of the
United States is to utilize economic manipulative means freely
to achieve desired political ends. For example, Ecuador argued
that the United States used illegal political and economic force
in its suspension of sales of military hardware in response to
Ecuadorian seizure of American fishing vessels within its
claimed territorial waters.
More recently, it has been asserted that the United States,
in its utilization of aggressive forms of economic manipulative
pressure (for example, eliminating and disrupting U.S. and inter-
national credit), undermined the stability of the Allende govern-
ment and contributed to its downfall.71
2. Customary Wartime Practice of States
The right of a belligerent State in time of war to resort to
measures of economic warfare against its adversary and to apply
economic sanctions against third States which violate their
obligations of neutrality is manifest. The imposition of economic
pressure upon the enemy has always been deemed. legitimate.
Although economic warfare has traditionally played only a sec-
ondary role, it has become of primary importance in modern
68 50 U.S.C. app. § 2402-2403 (1970).
69 See 15 C.F.R. % 370.1(a), 370.3(a)(ii), 378.1, 379.4 (1970).
- 22 U.S.C. 5 1611 (1951).
71 Supra note 54, at 1007.
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warfare. The result is that, although war is still primarily a
confrontation of nations and their armed forces, the civilian popula-
tion is no longer immune from the hardships and privations of
war.
The duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from supply-
ing belligerents with arms, ammunition, vessels, and military
provisions, whether for money or gratuitously. A neutral State
which sold arms and ammunition to a belligerent at a profit,
or supplied them as a gift, would violate the duty of impar-
tiality. 72
In the Alabama Claims arbitration, it was determined that
Great Britain had violated its duties as a neutral by failing to
prevent its nationals from constructing a number of vessels for
use by the Confederate Navy in the War Between the States.
Certainly, the United States today has violated its status of
neutrality by directly supplying Israel with massive military as-
sistance. 73
Article 6 of the Hague Convention of 1907 Respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War prohibits
"the supply in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral
Power to a belligerent, of warships, ammunition or war material
of any kind whatever."74
Customary practice suggests that the nation imposing eco-
nomic sanctions need not even be a belligerent in the hostilities.
For example, during the early portion of World War II, the United
States, although a declared neutral, imposed an embargo upon
the sale of oil and scrap iron and steel to various nations, including
Spain, Portugal and Japan.
It is in this context that one must remember that the United
States has traditionally been the primary supplier of armaments
and munitions to Israel. In fact, only 9 days after the outbreak
72 Id. at 738-739.
Economic warfare has not traditionally limited itself only to boycotts and
embargoes, but has encompassed naval blockades of both the imports and ex-
ports of belligerent enemy States. See W. MALLISON, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW
OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS 56-61
(1966); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER, supra note 22, at 488-509.
73 United States-Great Britain Arbitration, 1872, 4 Papers Relating to the
Treaty of Washington 49 (1872). See L. OPPENHEIM, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 208
(7th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1952).
74 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1962), reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 375 (1969).
Hague Convention XIII (1907) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 545.
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of the Yom Kippur War, the United States had begun to resupply
Israel with military equipment. Four days thereafter, President
Nixon requested that Congress appropriate more than $2 billion
in military assistance to Israel for fiscal year 1974.
It is argued that the Arab oil-exporting nations, as partici-
pants in the hostilities of October 1973 in varying degrees, were
entitled to take retaliatory measures against such neutral powers
as the United States which had supplied Israel with massive
quantities of war materials, some of which were reported to have
been delivered directly in occupied Arab territories.
International law has historically recognized and provided for
the use of economic sanctions by one combatant against another
during a time of war. The employment of economic measures
against neutrals gained wide currency during the Napoleonic wars,
and has today become an accepted part of our vocabulary of
"total war." The Arab policy of regulating the supply of crude
oil in response to the posture of consuming nations with respect
to the Middle East situation was a predictable and perhaps
expansive application of this tradition. At present, there is ap-
parently no principle of international law which prohibits an
embargo per se in the absence of applicable treaties. Foreign
trade has always been viewed as a matter solely within the pre-
rogative of sovereign governments. The general principles con-
tained in the Doctrine on Friendly Relations (to refrain from eco-
nomic coercion) and in the United Nations Charter (to abstain
from acts which threaten the peace) have been universally
ignored in the arena of foreign trade75
3. The Customary Practice of International Organizations
It must be recognized that the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74
was ostensibly a concerted undertaking of an international or-
ganization (OAPEC) rather than a coercive measure taken by
independent non-aligned States. Furthermore, the utilization of
economic means by international organizations to attain political
ends (whether legitimate or illegitimate) neither began nor ended
with the OAPEC embargo.
The framers recognized in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter
that certain forms of non-military intervention in the affairs of
States might constitute a threat to the peace, breach of the peace
or an act of aggression, and that pursuant to Article 39, such a
75 See supra note 54, at 1007.
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determination could be made by the Security Council. Moreover,
Article 41 permits the Security Council, in order to implement
its decisions, to utilize various economic coercive measures in-
cluding the "complete or partial interruption of economic rela-
tions . . .
The Security Council has made widespread use of these coer-
cive tools against both South Africa7° and Rhodesia77 by initiating
embargoes on various commodities, including petroleum. The
General Assembly also has recommended that States observe
embargoes on the shipment of petroleum to, for example, the
People's Republic of China and North Korea.
7 8
The Organization of American States has instituted boycotts
on a variety of products, including petroleum, from the Dominican
Republic and Cuba.7 9  Similarly, the Organization of African
Unity has called for the imposition of embargoes, particularly
on the supply of oil, against Israel, Portugal, South Africa and
Rhodesia. 80
4. Customary Self-Defense: Necessity & Proportionality
The customary international law requirements for the assertion
of a claim of lawful self-defense traditionally have been framed
in terms of: (a) actual necessity and (b) proportionality in re-
sponding coercion8i
The Arab view has always been that continued Israeli occupa-
tion of Palestinian territory, 82 and, in particular, the territories
of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, constitutes a violation of the sov-
ereignty of the Arab States in total disregard of Security Council
76 See Res. 191, 19 U.N. SCOR, 1964 Resolutions and Decisions of the Se-
curity Council 13, 15 (1966); Res. 282, 25 U.N. SCOR, 1970 Resolutions and
Decisions of:the Security Council 11, 12 (1971).
17 Res. 221, 21 U.N. SCOR, 1966 Resolutions and Decisions of the Security
Council 5-7 (1968); Res. 232, 23 U.N. SCOR, 1968 Resolutions and Decisions
of the Security Council 5 (1970).
78 G.A. Res. 500, 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20A) Add. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/1557 (1965). See L. SOHN, THE UNITED NATIONS IN ACTION 93-111 (1968).
79 See Muir, supra note 60, at 191.
"I Shihata, supra note 16, at 620-621.
Si See Mallison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine - Interdiction: National
and Collective Defense Claims Valid Under International Law, 31 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 335 (1962).
82 See Note, The Palestinian People and Their Political, Military and Legal
Status in the World Community, 5 N.C. CENTRAL L. J. 326, 328 (1974); Akehurst,
The Arab.Israeli Conflict and International Law, 5 N. Z. U. L. REV. 231-33 (1973).
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Resolution 242. In 6 years, Israel had not relinquished control
over a single square inch of occupied real estate.83  In fact,
Israel today controls six times more territory than it did in 1948.
It, therefore, appeared necessary to the Arab States to force
implementation of what they perceived to be the rule of law.
The military strength of Israel seemed so formidable that the
surrounding Arab States could not forcibly regain control over
their respective sovereign territories. The OAPEC nations were
without the substantial military means to assist Egypt and Syria
in their attack launched in October 1973. Nevertheless, the
OAPEC States had at their disposal the enormous economic
leverage necessary to bring requisite pressure to bear on the world
community and, in particular, the United States which, by its
moral and material support, had enabled Israel to retain military
control for so long. The embargo's focus upon the United States
exemplified the discriminating application of the embargo against
States which had violated their neutrality. Thus, the withholding
of a vital commodity to the United States by the OAPEC cartel
was made in retaliation for the military commodities and diplo-
matic support given by the United States to a belligerent in the
conflict, -Israel. The economic coercion was, therefore, perceived
by the Arab States to be proportional to the harm suffered.
D. Conventional International Law
1. The Relevant Multilateral Conventions: GATT & VCOT
Probably the most significant multilateral convention gov-
erning international trade is the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT),84 to which all major non-communist nations
are parties. In fact, more than 76 nations, including Egypt and
83 Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban has emphasized that Resolution 242
called for the establishment of a permanent peace, including both the with-
drawal from territory occupied in 1967 and the establishment of "secure and rec-
ognized" boundaries. He asserts that the impasse arose because the Egyptians
constantly refused to submit the boundary issue to negotiations. "If we had
been mad enough to abandon the Golan Heights and Sharm el Sheikh and all
the Sinai and the whole West Bank [of the Jordan River], would not the mas-
sive attack launched on October 6 have murdered thousands of our civilians, de-
vastated our population centers and brought us to catastrophe? I tell you, a
massacre more hideous than Auschwitz would have been a real prospect and
Israel's survival would be in doubt." Another Round in the War of Words,
TIME, Oct. 29, 1973, at 44.
4 Signed at Geneva on Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187; 4 U.S.T. 6391 (1947).
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Kuwait, are contracting parties to the convention, and Algeria,
Bahrain and Qatar have accepted its de facto application.5
GATT was designed to insure access to international markets
and to bar discriminatory tariffs in foreign commerce. s6 How-
ever, the convention also contains language which guarantees
access to the exports of other countries. For example, Article
XI provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import
or export licenses or other measures shall be instituted or main-
tained . . . on the exportations of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.
Thus, a member nation is prohibited from imposing export
restrictions except in certain circumstances. If restrictions are
imposed, it must do so in a manner which gives recognition to
historic trade patterns between itself and countries which it has
traditionally supplied. 7
The exceptions contained in Article XX, which permit restric-
tions relating to domestic programs designed to conserve exhaust-
ible natural resources, nevertheless prohibit such restrictions when
"applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail." However, Article XXI permits each con-
tracting party to take "any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in
time of war or other emergency in international relations."88
85 However, a number of oil-producing States have never subscribed to
GATT, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union and Vene-
zuela. Muir, Th'e Changing Legal Framework of International Energy Management,
9 INT'L LAW. 605, 612 (1975). Thus, not being parties to the agreement, they
are not bound by its terms, except insofar as the convention may reaffirm exist-
ing principles of customary international law.
16 GATT has not, however, always been successful in securing its objec-
tives.
87 Muir, supra note 85.
Article XIII provides that prohibitions or restrictions on exports must be ad-
ministered without discrimination against third countries.
88 The exceptions contained in Articles XX and XXI have been charac-
terized by a leading authority as a "dangerous loophole to the obligations of
GATT," J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748 (1969).
It has been argued that viewing the Arab embargo in light of the exception
contained in Article XXI(b)(iii) leads one to the conclusion that: "(1) Arab
reliance on this exception in the GATT must fail in view of the actual context
and relevant provisions of the U.N. Charter, which must be utilized as a guide to
rational, policy-serving interpretation. (2) The Arab oil cuts must be condemned
as 'arbitrary' in the sense of the purposes of the GATT and in light of the
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Thus, the agreement maintains the freedom of each party to de-
termine the necessity of the action it takes in such extraordinary
circumstances. Moreover, Article XXXV provides for an escape
from GATT obligations for any two contracting parties which
have failed to consummate bilateral tariff negotiations. No such
negotiations have been entered into between Kuwait, the sole
Arab oil-exporting party, and any other party to the agreement. 89
Article 52 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
(VCOT) provides that "a treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles
of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Na-
tions. "90
The Arab oil embargo was directed at noncombatant nations
at a time when the armed conflict ostensibly had been termi-
nated. It was not implemented in order to improve materially
the Arab's military position, 91 but was instead employed as a
means to alter the relative bargaining positions of the parties in
whatever political settlement might eventuate through the im-
plementation of Security Council Resolution 242. Thus, a treaty
establishing boundaries, refugee rights, and national security
might be concluded between the Arab States and Israel. How-
ever, the aforementioned provision of the VCOT apparently pro-
hibits use of the oil weapon as a measure of economic coercion in
the attainment of political objectives. The difficulty lies in de-
termining whether the economically coercive measures are ap-
plied with such intensity as to obviate freedom of choice and
constitute duress.92
unilateral character of the Arab decisions. (3) The oil cuts are 'unjustifiable'
(even if not arbitrary) in that a joint Arab committee decided upon them in
terms of the pro-Arab or anti-Arab posture of other states. (4) The oil cuts
are additionally 'unjustifiable' in terms of serving the relevant goals of the
international community as contained in the UN Charter." Paust & Blaustein,
supra note 21, at 424.
89 Shihata, supra note 16, at 623.
90 Supra note 74.
91 The embargo may have been implemented, in part, in order to discourage
Israeli annihilation of the isolated Egyptian Third Army. In what must rank
as Israel's most brilliant military feat in the nation's short but tempestuous
history, an Israeli task force of 20,000 men and 500 tanks crossed the Suez Canal
and proceeded to Adabiya and Suez cutting the highway to Cairo. It then
successfully isolated and neutralized, both politically and militarily, the Egyp-
tian Third Army of 20,000 men and 400 tanks, which had crossed to the east
side of the Suez Canal during the early days of the Yom Kippur War. See
Brilliant Moves in a Final Battle, TIME, Nov. 5, 1973, at 44-45. See also Now for
the Bitter Battles of Peace, TIME, Nov. 12, 1973, at 57.
92 Boorman, supra note 10, at 216.
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2. The Relevant Bilateral Treaties: FCN
The maintenance of international trade and commercial rela-
tions is one of the primary objectives of treaties of friendship, com-
merce and navigation (FCN) into which the United States has
entered with over 40 nations. These agreements generally accord
Most Favored Nation treatment to both exports and imports of
the contracting parties. The commitment by one party not to
discriminate prohibits a boycott against the other contracting
party unless such restriction is applied to like imports from or
exports to all other countries. 93
Four members of OAPEC (Iraq, Muscat, Oman and Saudi
Arabia) have long-standing bilateral FCN treaties with the United
States. Each has agreed to accord Most Favored Nation treat-
ment as a measure of reciprocity with the United States. The
agreement consummated between the United States and Muscat
and Oman in 1958 provides an exception to its application vis-a-vis
measures "necessary to fulfill the obligations of a Party for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security,
or necessary to protect its essential security interests." 94  The
agreement concluded between the United States and Iraq in 1938
permits exceptions to its application relating to "the adoption or
enforcement of measures relating to neutrality or to rights and
obligations arising under the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions. ' 1" It is clear from these provisions that Muscat, Oman and
Iraq only intend to be bound by the FCN agreements during
periods in which trade and commerce are a product of amicable
relations between the States concerned, and not under circum-
stances where the rights of neutrality and belligerency serve to
suspend normal trade relations. 96  The wording of the FCN
agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which
was consummated in 1933, suggests that quantitive restrictions up-
on exports are not prohibited thereby. 97
93 Muir, supra note 60, at 200.
"I Treaty with Muscat and Oman and Dependencies on Amity, Economic
Relations and Consular Rights, Dec. 20, 1958, art. XI, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1835,
T.I.A.S. No. 4530.
9" Treaty with Iraq on Commerce and Navigation, Dec. 3, 1938, art. IV,
54 Stat. 1790, T.S. No. 960, 203 L.N.T.S. 107.
% Boorman, supra note 10 at 218.
91 Provisional Agreement with Saudi Arabia on Diplomatic and Consular
Representation, Juridical Protection, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 7, 1933,
48 Stat. 1826, E.A.S. No. 53, 142 L.N.T.S. No. 329. An interpretative presump-
tion in favor of an exception of its application on grounds of national security
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Finally, it has been argued that the combination of Articles
103 and 51 of the U.N. Charter effectively supercedes the appli-
cation of Most Favored Nation provisions insofar as international
peace and security are concerned. 98
IV. U.S. RETALIATORY ALTERNATIVES
A. Domestic Conservation and Alternative Energy Sources
When a Gallup Poll asked Americans: "What should the U.S.
do if Arabs impose another boycott," the largest group, 35 per-
cent, responded by saying that the United States should attempt
to become self-sufficient. 99
During the last three decades, the world has consumed more
energy than in all of previous history. In the next 15 years, man-
kind is expected to consume as much energy as it has up to now.
It is anticipated that more than 70 percent of these requirements
for energy will have to be met by hydrocarbons (specifically, 16
percent by gas and 54 percent by oil).1 ° Between 1970 and 1985,
total U.S. energy consumption is projected to double from 33
million to 63 million barrels per day. The consumption of pe-
troleum by the European Economic Community in the same period
is expected to increase by 93 percent; that of Japan by 156 per-
cent.10' However, dwindling supplies of fossil fuels - petroleum,
natural gas and coal - and distribution problems threaten to curb
this exponential growth abruptly.
During the interim period before fossil fuels are depleted, man
faces the immediate dangers of contaminating his environment by
the intensive utilization of fossil fuels or by the imprudent and
premature deployment of new energy sources.10 2
To many experts, "the energy crisis" was no more compli-
cated than a recognition by the United States that it was approach-
interests might well be derived from a treaty of this nature. A similar pre-
sumption may also be established on grounds of international public policy.
Shihata, supra note 16, at 624. Accord, Schwarzenberger, 7he Most-Favored-
Nation Standard in British State Practice, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 96, 110, 111, 120
(1945).
98 Boorman, supra note 10 at 218.
91 At Hand: Even Higher Fuel Prices, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 3,
1975, at 22.
100 Amuzegar, The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play, 51 FOR. AFF. 676
(1973).
101 Id. at 677.
102 V. YANNACONE, JR., ENERGY CRISIS DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY 4 (1974).
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ing the end of its fossil fuel reserves, with little hope of new power
sources for the next 15 years. 103
In the United States current domestic reserves are only ap-
proximately 36.8 billion barrels, including 10 billion barrels in
Alaska.104 Moreover, new finds are not keeping pace with the
rate of extraction so that total reserves have declined since 1972.
Consequently, unless adequate substitute sources of energy are
developed, the United States will be compelled to import in-
creasing amounts of petroleum.10s
The United States is the most profligate energy consumer,
consuming one-third of the world's supply. This pattern of con-
sumption has, in part, been attributable to the relatively low
prices heretofore paid for energy. 1 6  The extent of increased
U.S. dependence upon imported petroleum will be largely de-
termined by its ability to conserve energy and increase domestic
energy production. Should a greater dependence on imports en-
sue, a future embargo would have a more severe and devasting
effect upon the U.S. economy than did the Arab oil embargo of
1973.107
The 12 OPEC nations produce 54 percent of all the oil in the
world, and hold 64 percent of the world's currently proven re-
serves. The proven oil reserves of exporting Arab nations are:
103 One source has listed five primary energy policy objectives:
1. Assuring reliability of energy supply;
2. Achieving the lowest cost to society for energy;
3. Avoiding economic and regional inequities;
4. Safeguarding the quality of the environment; and,
5. Minimizing international problems due to energy.
ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, EXPLORING ENERGY CHOICES 10
(1974).
104 The Alaska pipeline will transport in excess of 2 million barrels of oil a
day by 1980, or one-third of current U.S. oil imports. Projections indicate
that the North Slope of Alaska has potential reserves of as much as 80 billion
barrels. Thus, Alaskan production could eventually be between 5 and 6 million
barrels a day. Major Oil-Consuming Countries Meet at Washington to Discuss the
Energy Problem, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 201, 212 (1974).
Geologists also estimate that approximately 330 trillion cubic feet of natural gas
deposits could supply 5 percent of U.S. annual demand, which is currently 22
trillion cubic feet. However, such energy resources are not expected to be avail-
able earlier than 1980. The Alaska Gas Rush, TIME, Dec. 20, 1975, at 60.
105 Muir, Legal and Ecological Aspects of the International Energy Situation, 8
INT'L LAW. 1, 2 (1974). See U.S. Leaning Heavier than Ever on Foreign Oil, U. S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 5, 1976, at 36.
106 Major Oil-Consuming Countries Meet at Washington to Discuss the Energy
Problem, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 201, 210 (1974).
107 NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FOR INTERRUPTION
OF PETROLEUM IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES 17 (1974).
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Saudi Arabia with 132 billion barrels; Kuwait with 64 billion;
Iraq with 31.5 billion; Libya with 25.5 billion; the United Arab
Emirates with 25.5 billion; and Qatar with 6.5 billion.108
Currently, the United States must import 37.4 percent of its
total consumption of petroleum, or 7 million barrels per day.109
The U.S. Department of the Interior predicts that by 1985 do-
mestic oil-production deficits relative to projected demand will
range from 8 million barrels per day (41 percent of demand) to
as much as 16.2 million barrels per day (65 percent of demand).
A recent study undertaken by the Chase Manhattan bank pre-
dicts that by 1985 as much as 50 percent of U.S. demand will
have to be met by imports, over two-thirds of which (11.6 million
barrels per day) will have to be sought from Middle East sources.
Although recent discoveries in South America, Canada and
Alaska may enable the United States to avoid some dependency
on Arab petroleum, by 1985 declining reserve-to-production ratios
in Venezuela and increasing demand in South America and Can-
ada may mean that only between 3.44 and 5.70 million barrels
per day of U.S. consumption can be drawn from Western Hemi-
sphere sources. This deficit is expected to widen as domestic
demand increases and environmental pressure forces enactment of
legislation favoring low-polluting fuels.11o
To meet the enormous energy demands of the future, three al-
ternatives present themselves: (1) To increase the supply of con-
ventional sourc-;s (for example, coal, natural gas, crude oil and
hydroelectricity); (2) to develop more expensive substitutes (for
example, oil shale, tar sand and nuclear power); and/or (3) to
develop exotic energy potentials (for example, solar power, geo-
thermal energy, tidal waves and hydrogen fusion)."'
Fossil fuels heretofore have been the primary source of energy
in the United States, accounting for 95 percent of total U.S.
energy consumption during 1973. Even with the most aggressive
growth in nuclear power, fossil fuels will dominate energy supply
throughout the rest of the 20th century.
Oil and gas presently represent over three-fourths of total
U.S. energy consumption. Natural gas is the cleanest major
108 OPEC's Oil and Money Machine: How It Works, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Oct. 28, 1974, at 38.
109 Pay More, Get Less: Oil-Gas Outlook, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27,
1975.
110 Best, Middle East Oil and the U.S. Energy Crisis: Prospects for New Ven-
tures in a Changed Market, 5 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 215, 246 (1973).
1I Supra note 100, at 677.
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energy source; oil is the most versatile. However, oil and gas
may well be our scarcest energy sources over the long term. n2
The United States holds prodigious reserves of coal. In fact,
one-third of the world's known deposits are located in the United
States. As much as 437 billion tons of coal are presently recov-
erable under existing methods of extraction - a volume equal to a
3 40-year supply of energy. Annual coal production in the United
States rose from 592 million tons in 1973 to an all time high of
640 million tons last year. President Ford called for a doubling of
coal output by 1985.
Recent estimates indicate that the United States holds 3.2
trillion tons of coal.1i4 However, ecological opposition to large-
scale utilization of our vast deposits of coal might be severe." 5 Coal
is the worst polluter of the energy sources. Its smoke contains
sulphur compounds which, when mixed with water vapor in the
air, becomes an acid which decomposes stone and metal, not to
mention human lungs. Moreover, enormous deposits require sur-
face mining for economically feasible extraction." 6  Increases in
the supply of coal and hydroelectricity are costly, time-consuming
and replete with significant technological limitations. Exotic
energy source potentials are expected to remain marginal because
of enormous technological complexities and high costs." 7  The
112 ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, A TIME TO CHOOSE 181
(1974).
113 King Coal's Return: Wealth and Worry, TIME, Mar. 1, 1976, at 45.
114 This nation's proven, reserves of oil will satisfy the energy requirements
of the United States for 12 years, gas for 12 years, and, amazingly, coal for 500
years. U. S. Proven Energy Reserves, TIME, Feb. 9, 1976, at 15.
115 Ecological opposition to expansive utilization of atomic energy resources is
also increasing. See Atomic Power - Why the Dream Gets Dimmer By the Day,
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 16, 1976, at 49.
116 Muir, supra note 105, at 5. See Energy Crisis in America, CONG. QUARTERLY
27-37 (1973).
117 Amuzegar, supra note 100, at 677.
In addition to the conventional sources such as oil, gas and coal, the United
States will require the development of new sources of energy including solar,
geothermal and nuclear fusion. For an analysis of the availability of capital to
finance the development of energy sources, see Joint Hearings on the Capability of
U.S. Financial Markets to Capitalize Energy Projects Required for the United States
to Move Toward Energy Independence Before two Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See Alternatives to Oil, TIME, Dec. 10, 1973,
at 43, and Shift to Shale, TIME, Dec. 10, 1973, at 44.
Oil shale is one of the nation's most abundant energy sources, with oil in
high-grade shale estimated to be the equivalent of the present levels of U. S. oil
consumption for a century. However, the environmental problems in obtaining
it with present technology are more difficult and far-reaching than those for coal.
ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, A TIME TO CHOOSE 182 (1974).
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rapid expansion of alternative energy sources is restrained, in
the short term, by human and environmental considerations. 118
Certainly, programs of conservation of domestic petroleum
and diminished consumption must be employed. 119 Tariffs on
imported oil may be increased; price controls on domestic oil may
be removed; gasoline rationing may be imposed;12° tax incentives
for domestic production and exploration may be employed.121
The Ford Administration attempted to decrease the amount of
petroleum imported from abroad by 1 million barrels per day by
the end of 1975, and 2 million barrels per day by the end of 1977.122
Nevertheless, one source has indicated that consumption would
have to be decreased to such an extent that half of U.S. industry
would be without fuel and half of the U.S. work force would be
118 Id. at 158.
119 See Farmanfarmaian, Gutowski, Okita, Roosa & Wilson, How Can the
World Afford OPEC Oil? 53 FOR. AnF. 201 (1975).
120 Strict motor gasoline rationing suggests itself as a way to accclerate and
increase energy savings in the transportation sector. Regulations could also be
promulgated to alter the product/yield ratios for domestic refineries in order to
maximize heating oil production. B. COOPER, AN ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF
THE ENERGY EMERGENCY 16 (1973).
121 During the Arab oil embargo, in an attempt to counteract the impending
energy crisis, the Administration on November 26, 1973, announced a number
of actions designed to curtail the demand for petroleum products. These actions
were taken pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, and the Defense
Production Act of 1950. They consisted of allocation reduction to various end
users. The National Energy Act of 1973 provided additional use restrictions in
an effort to conserve existing petroleum supplies. Id. at 11-12.
It was also suggested that the additional measures of (a) strict motor gasoline
rationing, and (b) regulations altering the product/yield ratios of domestic
refineries in order to maximize heating oil production, should be implemented.
Id. at 16.
In November of 1973, President Nixon inaugurated Project Independence,
which was designed to insure an expansion in domestic energy production so
that the United States would no longer be subject to economic disruption, or
the threat of disruption, from a sudden curtailment of vital energy supplies.
The Project was designed (a) to conserve energy by establishing a new energy
ethic designed to reduce demand, (b) to increase production of all forms of energy
in the United States, and (c) to meet the energy requirements of the United
States at the lowest cost consistent with the protection of both national security
and environment. Major Oil-Consuming Countries Meet at lWIashiugton to 1)iscuss
the Energy Problem, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 201, 210 (1974).
122 Supra note 109, at 35. The U. S. goal is to reduce its annual growth rate
in energy consumption from the present 4 to 5 percent to 2 or 3 percent by 1980.
If this can be accomplished, approximately 7 million barrels of oil per day
could be saved.
For an analysis of the mandatory oil import programs instituted by the United
States, see Note, The Mandatory Oil Import Program: A Review oj Present Regulations
and Proposals for Change in the 1970's, 7 TEX. INT'L L. J. 373 (1972).
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unemployed before U.S. demand would be diminished to an
extent that would compel OPEC to cut prices. 123
The Federal Government has not been lethargic in responding
to the energy crisis. Indeed, it has displayed an acute awareness
of the complexity of the problem, as well as enormous vitality
in an attempt to develop an effective policy designed to find a
solution to the energy requirements of this nation. For example,
during the Arab oil embargo, Congress provided the President
with discretionary powers to implement a temporary program of
emergency petroleum allocation to deal with shortages of crude oil,
residual fuel oil, and refined petroleum products, or dislocations
in their national distribution system. 124
Congress has subsequently responded to the impending energy
crisis by creating the Federal Energy Administration (FEA).
Its purpose is to assure a coordinated and effective approach to
overcoming energy shortages. FEA is specifically designed to:
(a) Develop effective programs of conservation of scarce energy
supplies, (b) insure fair and efficient distribution of such supplies,
(c) maintain fair and reasonable consumer prices for such sup-
plies, (d) promote the expansion of readily available energy
sources, and (e) assist in the development of policies and plans
to meet the energy requirements of the United States. 2'
The Energy Research and Development Administration and
Nuclear Regulatory Commission were created in 1974 to plan,
coordinate, support and manage the research and development of
energy sources. 26  Congress has recognized that "the urgency of
123 Ignotus, Seizing Arab Oil, HARPER'S, Feb. 1975, at 48.
124 Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. % 751 to 756
(1973). See Cockrell, Federal Regulation of Energy: The Exceptions Process, 7
TRANSPORTATION L.J. 83 (1975). For a critical analysis of contemporary domestic
restrictions on the importation of oil, see National Security and Oil Import Regula-
tion: The License Fee Approach, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 399 (1975).
125 Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. % 761 to 786
(1974). Congress has not been unmindful of the environmental considerations.
See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act o3 1974, 15 U.S.C.
§ 791 to 798 (1974).
126 Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. % 5801 to 5891 (1974).
ERDA absorbed and abolished the preexisting Atomic Energy Commission.
See 42 U.S.C. § 5814 (1974). It has been asserted that, despite these efforts
undertaken by Federal agencies, the United States continues to import 17 billion
barrels of oil per day, 25.5 percent of which comes from the Middle East. See
Mirvahabi, supra note 8, at 109. See also Best, Middle East Oil and the U.S. Energy
Crisis - Prospects for New Ventures in a Changed Market, 5 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
247 (1973).
Nevertheless, the United States reduced its total energy consumption in
1975 by approximately 2.5 percent since 1974, and 4.8 percent since 1973. U.S.
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the Nation's energy challenge will require commitments similar
to those undertaken in the Manhattan and Apollo projects,"127
in an attempt to formulate a comprehensive and aggressive
research and development program designed to increase the avail-
ability of domestic energy reserves (for example, fossil fuels, nu-
clear fuels, geothermal resources and solar energy).128 More re-
cently, legislation was promulgated extending Presidential powers
to impose mandatory rationing in times of emergency, and
authorizing a massive stock-piling of petroleum to avert the full
impact of any future oil embargo.129  Certainly an emergency
stockpile of oil must be set aside at a rate commensurate with
the level of imports from insecure sources.
B. Diplomatic and Political Remedies
Despite the enthusiastic and determined efforts of the State
Department, diplomacy has failed to bring down the high price of
oil. It is unlikely that mere verbal persuasion would induce Arab
leaders to end a future embargo of petroleum unless, of course, the
Israelis were diplomatically persuaded to grant territorial conces-
sions to the Palestinians. Nevertheless, the determined applica-
tion of direct and indirect diplomatic pressure would and should
be a condition precedent to the use of force.
Several Arab oil-producing States have warned that the United
States cannot be assured of obtaining uninterrupted supplies of oil
unless it modifies its pro-Israeli foreign policy. Because of the
increasing reliance of the United States upon imported oil, many
American foreign policy experts believe that this Arab threat is
credible. They suggest that the goal of "improving U.S. oil se-
curity" justifies reversing present Middle East policy to lend more
positive support to Arab interests. t °  Moreover, it has been sug-
gested that it might become necessary to withdraw U.S. diplo-
matic and military support to Israel as the political price for
growing quantities of secure oil. Inasmuch as other, less drastic
oil consumption decreased 155 million barrels in 1975. These reductions have
been attributed to: (a) The nation's economic slump, (b) higher fuel prices, (c)
energy conservation efforts, and (d) relatively mild winters. Benjamin, Energy
Use Cut 2.5% in '75, Wash. Post, Apr. 5, 1976, at A-5, col. 1.
127 42 U.S.C. § 5901 (b) (1974).
12 See Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5901 to 5915 (1974).
129 See Energy: What New Law Does to Fuel Prices and Supplies, U.S. NEws
& WORLD REP., Jan. 5, 1976, at 32.
130 See Blackmail by Oil, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 20, 1973, at 8.
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options exist, the American people will presumably be unwilling
to pay such a drastic price for additional oil. 131
The United States could withdraw its military mission from
Saudi Arabia; but, no doubt, the French would be delighted to
send a military mission as a replacement. The United States
could also refuse to sell military material to Arab States, were
other sources not readily available.
Some U.S. and European businessmen and politicians have
suggested that an effort should be made to have the United Na-
tions declare Arab oil an "international resource," which would
be open to all investors under U.N. supervision. Because the
composition of the General Assembly is heavily weighted against
industrialized nations, such a resolution would never receive a
majority of votes.
Another alternative might be a unilateral special arrangement
with one or more oil-exporting nations (for example, Saudi Arabia
and/or Iran). In return for technical and military assistance
and preferential treatment for other exports, the United States
might acquire long-term commitments for specified quantities of
oil. 132 The oil-producing States are acutely aware that their
economies are based upon a wasting asset, and that unless they
acquire an alternate base for their economies within the next
few decades, they may lose their single opportunity to achieve
economic prosperity and development. It is precisely in the
fields of economic planning, science and technology and industrial
development, that the consuming nations can provide something
to the producing nations which the latter desperately need. 133
However, even if such agreements could be reached, they
would represent a major departure by the United States from the
principle of multilaterlism in international economic relations.
Other oil-importing nations could be expected to seek similar
agreements, conceivably creating severe competition among
Western industrialized nations and straining relations among al-
lies. The United States might also find itself deeply committed
to the survival of the specific governments with whom the agree-
ments are signed. Moreover, no agreement can guarantee pre-
vention of an embargo if there is an impasse in the Arab-Israeli
131 See ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, A TIME TO CHOOSE
168 (1974).
132 Id.
133 Muir, The Changing Legal Framework of International :iergy lanagement,
9 INT'L LAW. 605, 614 (1975).
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settlement and the United States continues to support the Is-
raeli position. 134
The oil strategy announced by Secretary of State Kissinger
in 1974 included: (a) Immediate reduction in oil consumption
by the United States and other industrial nations in order to
lower the cost of imported petroleum, (b) coordinated measures
to develop alternate sources of oil and other fuels over the next
decade, 135 and (c) the joint establishment of a $25 billion loan
and guarantee fund by major nations to provide secondary fi-
nancing for the industrial nations' $40 billion annual oil payment
deficit.
In fact, 16 nations, including the United States, have become
members of the recently created International Energy Agency
(lEA). lEA, the West's counterpart to OAPEC, will cooperate
closely with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). LEA members have already agreed
upon a system of sharing oil supplies should a future embargo
be instituted.136
On March 20, 1975, the United States agreed in principle
134 Supra note 131, at 169.
135 Limiting oil importation, and rapidly increasing the expansion of nuclear
power, raises another energy-related foreign policy concern - the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. The commercial application of nuclear power in the produc-
tion of electricity is on the verge of rapid expansion throughout the world. In
1973, 67 nuclear power plants were operating outside the United States in 29
different countries. In essence, the problem is that relatively few technological
impediments exist to prohibit a government from taking nuclear material from a
civilian nuclear program and manufacturing crude nuclear weapons.
A prudent effort to reduce the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and
the concomitant threat to the existence of humanity, is for nuclear-exporting
nations to achieve agreement in limiting exportation of nuclear reactor and
uranium enrichment materials. As a part of such an agreement, the nuclear
exporters could then provide Third and Fourth World nations with technical
and financial assistance so that they can develop more economical, domestic
reserves (for example, solar, hydroelectric, organic wastes and geothermal).
The risk of nuclear annihilation increases in a world where energy require-
ments escalate at an enormous rate. Thus, the reductioit of the nuclear weapons
proliferation risk, which increases inexorably with the expansion of nuclear
power, should be an urgent priority of U. S. diplomacy. Supra note 131, at 171.
1 America's Floundering Oil Policy, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 23, 1974, at 80. See
.Atgreement on an International Energy Program, Paris, Nov. 18, 1974, 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATS. 1 (1975). Should a shortage of 7 percent affect all of the parties, they
are committed to reducing their demand by 7 percent. Should the shortage
reach 12 percent, the parties are required to reduce demand by 10 percent and,
if deemed necessary, to utilize reserve supplies and share all petroleum in their
possession, including imports and domestic supplies. Allocations would be made
by the quasi-independent industry advisory body within the International Energy
Agency. Supra note 133, at 612.
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with the other 17 lEA members to the establishment of a common
floor price on oil imports. The proposed minimum import price
was designed to protect domestic energy investments from be-
coming noncompetitive should world oil prices drop, and forms a
primary part of the Administration's effort to strengthen con-
sumer solidarity in dealing with OPEC.137
In order to cope with the short-range dangers of a new embargo
and oil-related, balance-of-payments problems, the lEA has cre-
ated a plan for mutual assistance in the event of an embargo,
involving emergency oil supplies, reduced consumption, and oil
sharing.138
A primary goal of U.S. diplomacy over the past 2 years has
been to disunite OPEC. The United States has attempted to
weld consuming nations into a bloc which would reduce oil
imports and accelerate development of alternative sources of
energy, 139 with the intention of reducing OPEC revenues to a
137The President of the United States currently holds broad powers under
the national security provisions (section 232) of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 to adjust import barriers for the protection of the domestic energy industry.
These powers, however, were not intended to be utilized to maintain a price
floor for the purpose of stimulating domestic investment. The Ford Administra-
tion, therefore, requested authority to establish a floor price in its proposed
Energy Independence Act of 1975 (Title IX).
The United States proposed a minimum import price and a program of
common investment incentives for high-cost synthetic fuel development and ofjoint research and development in more exotic fuel technologies, in an effort to
accelerate the development of additional domestic energy supplies in IEA coun-
tries. The minimum import price was designed to protect investment in the bulk
of conventional nuclear and fossil (gas, oil, coal) energy sources from future
competition of low-cost foreign oil imports. It was not designed to be high
enough to protect costly alternative energy sources (for example, shale oil, coal
gasification). The floor price could be' maintained by tariff, quota, or variable
levy, depending upon the preference of each individual participant.
The Subcommittee on International Economics of the Joint Economic
Committee rejected the Administration's proposal, concluding that a minimum
price for oil imports is not an appropriate method of protecting domestic
investments in conventional energy resources from becoming noncompetitive
should world oil prices drop, inasmuch as: (a) Existing investment incentives
are sufficient to achieve desired ends; (b) direct subsidization of energy invest-
ment would be more economical and equitable than a floor price; (c) the floor
price is a clumsy tool for curbing consumption; and (d) the floor price is un-
necessary to insure the United States against competitive disadvantage. See
SUBCOMM. ON INT'L ECON., JOINT ECON. Comm., THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S OIL
FLOOR PRICE PROPOSAL: SHOULD CONGRESS ENDORSE IT? 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1975). •
138 Katz, Department Discusses International Economic Policy, 43 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 707, 710 (1975).
139 The United States has entered into a number of both bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements with other nations for the collective research and develop-
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point which would compel some of its 13 member nations to slash
prices, thus dissolving the cartel. But the attempt has been un-
successful, and the policy is now being quietly abandoned.
The softening U.S. attitude is attributable to several factors.
First, predictions that a massive transfer of wealth to the oil-
producing States would cripple the industrial world's financial
and production systems have proven to be unfounded. Lush
export markets have been created in OPEC nations for U.S.,
Japanese and European goods. Much of the rise in oil prices
has already been absorbed by consuming nations. According to a
recent study by the Brookings Institute, even with higher oil
prices, the growth of disposable income in the developed world
will be reduced by only three percent between now and 1980.
Second, the Administration has been unable to rally Euro-
peans and Japanese to its anti-OPEC strategy. These nations
are far more dependent upon imported oil than is the United
States and are exceedingly reluctant to annoy the producing
States. t4°  France has even refused to join the lEA, which the
United States had hoped would unite consuming nations in a
struggle against OPEC pricing policies. Great Britain, which is
optimistic about North Sea oil, is hopeful that high crude prices
ment of alternative energy sources and more efficient utilization of existing
sources. A U. S. objective in confronting the energy crisis is adequacy of domestic
energy supplies - in effect, energy independence.
For a list and description of current U.S. cooperative programs in energy
research and development, see Pollack & Congdon, International Cooperation in
Energy Research and Development, 6 L & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 677 (1974).
140 Faced with the major "supply shock" of Oct. 1973 and the overall
reduction in Arab oil production, the immediate reaction of practically every
major importing nation was to engage in a competitive scramble for petroleum
supplies, coupled with offers to adapt its Middle East policy to satisfy Arab
demands. Levy, World Oil Cooperation or International Chaos, 52 FoR. AFF. 690,
696 (1974).
For example, the European Economic Community (EEC), whose ultimate
goal is eventual political unification, was unable during the Arab oil embargo to
retain even a vestige of economic unification with respect to its most essential
imported commodity - petroleum. Instead, each of the EEC members initiated
an independent diplomatic effort to achieve bilateral agreement with various
oil-exporting Arab States and thereby guarantee continued supplies. The
panic which swept the EEC may perhaps be attributable to two factors. First,
Europe is more heavily dependent upon imported oil than are most regions of
the world; in fact, of the enormous quantities of petroleum imported by Euro-
pean nations, 73 percent is imported from Middle East sources. Second, in-
asmuch as The Netherlands, an EEC member, was singled out by OAPEC
for particularly stringent treatment, its neighboring States may have decided
that disassociation therefrom might inhibit the wrath of Arab scorn which would
have otherwise arisen by a process of osmosis.
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will continue. Non-OPEC producers such as Mexico and Canada
have also benefited from the enormous cost of oil.
Third, OPEC has proved remarkably resilient because its
members are well aware that their power to control prices lies
in their ability to maintain a united front. Thus, cartel members
have been able to restrain traditional animosities. 141
Instead of confrontation, the United States is now seeking to
influence OPEC through accommodation with Saudi Arabia -
the cartel's most influential member and largest producer of
petroleum. The Saudis' ardent anti-communism, their support
of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat against more radical Arab
leaders, and their relatively moderate position on oil pricing make
them particularly acceptable to U.S. policymakers. 142
In the fall of 1975, the strategy proved to be successful, when
the Saudis held the OPEC price increase to 10 percent, although
some cartel members wanted much more. However, whether
OPEC will continue to present even a faqade of moderation re-
mains open to question. Iranian Interior Minister Jamshid
Amouzegar noted recently that with the expected worldwide
economic recovery, new oil price increases "will become pos-
sible again by mid-1976."143
Perhaps the most effective political strategy that the United
States could adopt is also the most constructive - continuing
its efforts as a broker to guarantee a peaceful settlement between
the Arabs and Israelis.
C. Economic Reprisals
Arab governments have concentrated the bulk of their invest-
ment capital in the short-term Eurocurrency market. Of the
$60 billion accumulated by OPEC in 1974, only 1.7 percent or
approximately $1 billion was placed in U.S. stocks and other
assets, approximately 6.7 percent or $4 billion was invested in
U.S. bank deposits, and 10 percent or $6 billion was placed in
141 Iran and Iraq have settled a long standing border dispute, and radical
Algeria agreed with Saudi Arabia's moderate pricing policies when the Saudis
presented Algeria with a generous loan. Living with OPEC, TIME, Jan. 19,
1976, at 54.
142 Despite its enormous wealth, Saudi Arabia is still essentially a feudal
State badly in need of agricultural and industrial development. Within the past
year, the United States has signed agreements to provide Saudi Arabia with
military and technical assistance, including electrification projects and agri-
cultural development programs. Id.
143 Id.
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U.S. government securities. The largest amount, 35 percent or
$21 billion, was invested in the Eurocurrency market, and an ad-
ditional 12.5 percent or $7.5 billion was invested in U.K. deposits
and government securities. The remaining capital was loaned to
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and to other
developed and developing nations.'" During 1974, $11 billion of
both short- and long-term investments were placed by OPEC
nations in the United States, and less than $1 billion of this
total represented foreign direct investment. 145  During the first
10 months of 1975, OPEC members invested $5.2 billion in the
United States. 146  Most of this capital has been placed in short-
term and highly liquid portfolio investments, although some
petrocapital, including a $10 million investment in an Atlanta hotel
and shopping complex, and the purchase of an entire island off
the coast of South Carolina, has been placed in long-term direct
investments. 147
The traditional economic policy of the United States has been
to minimize barriers for investment and to encourage the un-
restrained international movement of goods and capital. Thus,
for example, the United States was instrumental in the develop-
ment of the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movement by the
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Moreover, the United States is presently
engaged in the formulation within the OECD of consultative
agreements regarding departures from national treatment of
foreign investors or the institution of incentives or disincentives
for foreign investment. Additionally, the U.S. commitment to
non-restrictive treatment of foreign investment is embodied in an
144 Hearings on 5.425 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84 (1975).
145 Id. at 35.
146 Finance Trends, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1974, at 74. The
U. S. Treasury Department estimates that OPEC nations will have surplus
"investable" revenues of approximately $45 billion during 1976. This compares
with $41.6 billion for 1975 and $59.3 billion for 1974. The United States is ex-
pected to receive about 15 to 16 percent of the $41.8 billion which OPEC nations
invest abroad this year. OPEC Oil Profits Expected To Go For Increased hnports,
Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1976, at D-11, col. 7.
17 Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in the
Southeastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'' L. 247, 289 (1976). See Wilner,
Dempsey & Smith, Planning a System of Incentive and Regulatory Legislation
with Respect to Foreign Investment and Trade in Georgia 1975 (unpublished
study of the Georgia Institute of Government).
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extensive network of friendship, commerce and navigation
treaties.14
The policy of the United States is to admit and treat foreign
capital investments on a basis of equality or parity with domestic
capital. Restrictions at the Federal level apply to specific cate-
gories of enterprises having national security significance, or
involving the exploitation of certain natural resources, or in which
particular fiduciary relationships are involved.49
Existing federal statutes and regulations are generally receptive
to foreign investment, prohibiting acquisitions in only a few in-
dustries and under a few circumstances.150  Congress has re-
stricted foreign ownership of enterprises which are engaged in
certain exempted activities, such as domestic radio communica-
tions,151  coastal or inland shipping,152  and the production of
atomic energy. 153  Federal legislation also requires that firms
engaged in air transportation, 15 4 mining on Federal lands,15
s
and the development of hydroelectric power on navigable
streams156 be organized and chartered under United States law,
but has not prohibited foreign control of such companies. Neither
foreign nor domestic investors are required to seek governmental
permission to engage in U.S. business transactions, except in
those fields of special regulation and supervision, such as in-
surance, public utilities and banking.
5 7
With the massive transfer of wealth from Western industrial-
ized nations to petroleum exporting countries, and, in turn, the
investment by the latter of petrocapital into the former, a pro-
tectionist paranoia emerged in the United States. To a number
of Western financiers, the huge cash surpluses accumulated by
Arab oil-producing States is analogous to a Khanjar (Arab dagger)
poised at the jugular of international monetary stability. By
148 See Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Invest-
ment: Present U. S. Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956).
149 Supra note 144, at 84-85.
150 For a detailed evaluation of such legislation, see Elmer & Johnson, Legal
Obstacles to Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Corporations, 30 Bus. LAW. 681, 683
(1975).
151 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
152 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1970).
153 42 U.S.C. 2133 (1970).
154 49 U.S.C. § 1378, 1401, 1508 (1970).
155 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 24, 71, 181, 352 (1970).
156 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970).
157 Supra note 144, at 85.
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shifting their funds from one currency to another, the oil sheiks
could precipitate an unending round of monetary crises. 158
The United States could conceivably attempt to freeze Arab
oil investments in this nation. Approximately half of the capital
Saudia Arabia and Kuwait have deposited is held by U.S. banks.
But much of that is held by European branches of American
financial institutions - and European States may be unwilling
to permit their branches of U.S. banks to freeze Arab funds.
Moreover, unless the expropriation of Arab capital were ac-
complished almost instantaneously, the Arabs could sell their
threatened dollars for gold or other currencies, destroying the
strength of the dollar which has only recently begun to recover
from two devaluations and a long seige of selling.
Numerous legislative proposals have been introduced on the
floors of Congress which have been designed to prohibit, curb or
regulate foreign investment (both direct and portfolio) in the
United States. For example, Senator Harrison Williams, Jr.,
(D-N.J.) introduced the Foreign Investment Act of 1975 which
proposed to amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 so as to
require notification by foreign investors of proposed acquisitions
of equity securities of U.S. companies, and to authorize the
President to prohibit such acquisitions as he deemed appropriate
for purposes of national security, foreign policy or domestic econ-
omy. 5 9 Probably the most extreme legislative proposal was the
Dent-Gaydos bill, which would have amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 "to restrict persons who are not citizens
of the United States from acquiring more than 35 per centum of
the voting securities or more than 5 per centum of the voting
securities of any issuer whose securities are registered under such
Act. "160
It is fortunate that such extreme measures were rejected.
Prohibitions or severe restrictions upon foreign investment in the
United States might well make the dollar less attractive relative
to other currencies, and thus contribute to its decline in value.
A nationalistic approach to foreign investment could also provoke
similar retaliation against U.S. investment abroad which involves
a far greater commitment of capital than does foreign investment
158 Arab Caution, TIME, Dec. 24, 1974, at 78.
159 S. 425, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see supra note 135. See Robinson,
Department Discusses Foreign Policy Aspects of the Foreign Investment Act of 1975,
72 DEP'T STATE BULL. 378, 379-380 (1975).
160 H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 11265, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1974).
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in the United States. Finally, a need exists to encourage an
inflow of foreign capital, not only to balance the outflow of dollars
spent for petroleum imports, but also to provide funds for U.S.
domestic capital markets.161
When polled, the second largest group of Americans having
an opinion, 24 percent, believed that the United States should
retaliate with economic sanctions if Arab nations impose another
oil boycott.162 The United States could charge sharply higher
prices for all goods and services (including the massive quantities
of military hardware purchased by Arab States) sold to oil pro-
ducers. Alternatively, the United States could impose an eco-
nomic boycott against Persian Gulf States, refusing to sell arma-
ments, industrial equipment, food and other commodities to Arab
nations. 163  The financial institutions of industrial nations could
refuse to accept OPEC deposits unless they are long term, evenly
distributed, and at low interest - or possibly under any circum-
stances. Conceivably, the transfer of real assets could be
prohibited, and OPEC money could thus be forced to remain
paper money. 164
Such methods would, however, prove totally ineffective unless
the United States could persuade its European allies to participate.
A concerted Western boycott on manufactured products would
injure the Arabs, but Western economies more desperately re-
quire oil than the pre-industrial Arab States require modern
manufactures. With respect to the utilization of food as an eco-
nomic weapon in retaliation to the OAPEC embargo of pe-
troleum, former Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz indicated:
161 See Petrodollars Are Dollars, NAT'L REV., Apr. 11, 1975, at 384. The United
States has encountered a balance-of-payments deficit for 23 of the past 24 years.
See McDermott, Foreign Direct Investment Controls, 11 HARV. INT'L L. J. 490, 499
(1972). For an examination of the legislation introduced during the 93d and
94th Congresses, see Note, U.S. Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: Current
Developments and the Congressional Response, 15 VA. J. INT't L. 611 (1975); see
Dempsey, Primary Tax Incentives for Industrial Investment in the Southeastern United
States, 25 EMORY L.J. 789 (1976); see also Note, Evaluation of the Need for Further
Statutory Controls on Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 8 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 187 (1974); Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives for Foreign
Direct Investment in the Southeastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 247,
255-56 (1976).
162 At Hand: Even Higher Fuel Prices, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 3,
1975, at 22.
163 Ford's Warning to the Arabs - Will it Bring Down Oil Prices? U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Oct. 7, 1974, at 41.
164 Supra note 123, at 48.
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The Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 was imposed on the United
States and on Europe for the obvious purpose of eroding support
for Israel. To some extent it did achieve that purpose.
At that time it was suggested that we shut off our shipments
of food to the Arab nations in retaliation. But while we ship
food to the Arabs, they are not that dependent on us. If we
had shut off food to them at that time, they would have easily
replaced our shipments from other sources. 65
A U.S. refusal to sell armaments to Saudi Arabia will be
meaningless if France and Sweden are willing to sell. The re-
fusal of New York bankers to accept short-term deposits of petro-
dollars will be futile if Swiss bankers readily accept such deposits.
Would not South Africa sell its gold to Arabs willing to invest
dollars, marks and yen? Could the Japanese, who are totally
dependent upon imported oil, refuse Arab demands, however
outrageous, without facing economic disaster? Would not Com-
munist nations be willing to sell their wares to the Arabs? Even
in participating States, would not black market transfers of goods
and services be enormous?
Professors McDougal and Feliciano have indicated that:
Reprisals may be defined as violent measures which would
otherwise be unlawful, invoked as a response to and a sanction
against the prior unlawful violence of the enemy. The world
public order recognizes the legality of reprisals as a last des-
perate measure to secure law-conforming behavior. The origi-
nal effort of such order is to prevent change by violent means;
when that effort fails, recourse is had to the laws of war to
minimize unnecessary destruction of values; when observance
of the law of war breaks down, the only immediate recourse of
the injured is to reprisals in the hope that the enemy will recog-
nize the desirability of returning to observance of that law.166
A number of legal scholars do not believe that reprisals fall
within the ambit of legitimate self-defense under Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter. 167 However, there are authorities who take a con-
trary position. For example, Yoran Dinstein has asserted:
International law is created and determined by the practice
of States - not by lawyers, regardless of their erudition and
expertise, or by the misguided resolutions of nonlegislative
165 Food: Potent U.S. Weapon, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 16, 1976,
at 26.
16 McDougal & Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The
General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771, 883 (1958).
167 See I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE By STATES
281 (1963).
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bodies. Efforts to institute textbook tenets of international
law, confusing the lex lata with the lex ferenda and widely ignored
by States, only serve to perpetuate the layman's belief that the
international legal system is a chimerical notion.
Even in terms of sheer rationality, since war, the ultimate
weapon, is generally accepted as a legitimate form of self-
defense (in response to an armed attack), it is incomprehensible
that the use of a lesser weapon, a part rather than the whole,
should be regarded as objectionable. If war is a permissible
form of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, a
fortiori measures short of war, or more specifically, reprisals,
are also permissible.16 8
just as a legitimate claim of self-defense may justify uni-
lateral measures involving the use of force which would otherwise
be illegal under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, a State may
justify unilateral economic measures which might otherwise be
illegal if it can demonstrate that such measures are taken in self-
defense. Certainly, the requirements of self-defense must be
proved. The State would have to demonstrate that it was react-
ing to a wrongful action of another State, posing an immediate
danger to its independence or security in a situation affording
no alternative means of protection, and that the reaction was
proportionate to the harm threatened.16
9
in contrast to self-defense, reprisals are punitive in character
- they seek to impose reparation for the harm done, or to com-
pel a satisfactory settlement of the dispute created by the initial
illegal act, or to compel the delinquent State to abide by law in
the future. Because such action is taken after the event and when
the harm has already been inflicted, reprisals cannot be char-
acterized as a means of protection. 170 Because States will usually
justify their activity as lawful per se or justifiable self-defense,
economic measures which are openly admitted to be retaliatory
are rare.171 The legal control of economic reprisals must be ac-
complished in terms of the accepted preconditions for reprisals,
which are:
1. A prior international delinquency against the claimant
State. (This would exclude reprisals against economic mea-
sures not in themselves unlawful).
168 Dinstein, The Legal Issues of "Para-War" and Peace in the Middle East,
44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 466, 472 (1970).
169 Bowett, Economic Coercion and Reprisals by States, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
7 (1972).
170 Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 3 (1972).
171 Supra note 169, at 8.
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2. Redress by other means must be either exhausted or
unavailable.
3. The economic measures taken must be limited to the
necessities of the case and proportionate to the wrong done.172
D. Surreptitious Internal Involvement
No international covenant prohibits clandestine intelligence
operations, and today over 40 nations are actively engaged in
surreptitious activities. 173 Former CIA Director William Colby
has emphasized the ability of covert operations to solve a prob-
lem at an early stage before it develops into a severe interna-
tional crisis. 174  Nevertheless, various forms of U.S. intelligence
operations may have been effectively precluded by a combination
of Congressional investigations and press leaks. Such investi-
gatory activity may ultimately result in the promulgation of severe
legislative restrictions upon many of the clandestine activities of
U.S. intelligence agencies. There is no question but that an
American instigation of a coup d'etat would be a highly illegal
interference in the internal affairs of a foreign State. Neverthe-
less, considering the possibilities for nuclear war arising out of a
Super Power confrontation, it might be argued that a covert
operation designed to bring a leader to power in an Arab State
who would be willing to end a future oil embargo would be the
lesser of the two evils.
E. Military Intervention: The Last Resort
1. Invasion and Occupation
One retaliatory alternative available to the United States,
should the Arabs again impose an embargo upon the exportation
of petroleum, would be the military invasion and occupation of
Arab oilfields. The United States could easily defeat Arab
armies and, although the Arabs could probably sabotage the wells,
the technology of oil production in the desert is so simple that
the United States could induce a resumption in production in a
minimal amount of time. Such an option would, however, ap-
pear abhorrent to a nation dedicated to principles of world peace.
Moreover, a risk of war with the Soviet Union and the inherent
172 Id. at 9-10.
173 McCone, Why We Need the CIA, Wash. Star, Jan. 20, 1976, at A-16,
col. 3.
174 Compare It's Maddening and Frustrating, TLME, Jan. 19, 1976, at 16;. with
Can George Bush Save the CIA? U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 9, 1976, at 19.
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vulnerability of oil fields to guerrilla sabotage are omnipresent
obstacles in the military path.
President Ford, in a speech before the World Energy Confer-
ence held in Detroit, asserted:
Throughout history, nations have gone to war over natural
advantages such as water or food, or convenient passages on
land and sea. But in the nuclear age, when any local conflict
may escalate to global catastrophe, war brings unacceptable
risks for all mankind .. .
We recognize the desires of the producers to earn a fair
share or a fair price for their oil as a means of helping to de-
velop their own economies. But exorbitant prices can only
distort the world economy, run the risk of a worldwide depres-
sion and threaten the breakdown of world order and world
safety. 17s
A number of Washington officials have suggested that the
United States could eventually be forced to choose between eco-
nomic ruin and armed intervention. 176  Should the energy crisis
evolve into an international disaster, the possibility of a U.S. mil-
itary seizure of Arab oilfields cannot be discounted. Already,
one of the nation's leading "think tanks" has initiated a compre-
hensive study of America's military options in responding to the
oil crisis. 177
175 Ford's Warning to the Arabs - Will it Bring Down Oil Prices?, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Oct. 7, 1974, at 42.
176 Nationally syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported on November 8
that, on the basis of information from "important policy makers ... a grim new
mood is developing in Washington that military intervention may be necessary
to bring down the price of oil and save the West from economic ruin." A top-
level policy maker recently asserted, "We are determined to avoid provocative
threats. But we want the Arabs to understand that we are not ruling out the
use of American military power if the situation requires it." Another ob-
server commented, "The Arabs must be made to realize that 800 million people
in America, Europe and Japan are not going to permit their industrial societies
to be destroyed by 80 million Arabs." Will'U.S. Seize Mideast Oil?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1974, at 18.
177 Id. A U.S. defense consultant has laid down an entire blueprint for
the invasion of Saudi Arabia, in an article recently published in Harper's maga-
zine. Briefly, the plan includes a first wave Marine division, with one or two
battalions amphibious-landed and the rest unloaded from aboard ship, and an
'airlift wave of the 82nd Airborne Division, whose C-5 and C-141 jet transports
would be briefly staged and refueled in Israel, flown across Saudi Arabia to
Dhahran and escorted by air-refueled Phantom fighters, which would also be
based on Israeli fields or aboard carriers in the Arabian sea. One or two
paratroop batallions would jump to seize the Dhahran airfield, and once the
airfield was secured, the rest of the troops would land. Soon after the Marines
landed, a second Army division would arrive, the First Cavalry, by air, and
staged by way of Israel, except for the tanks, which would be unloaded from
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Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, when asked if the United
States was contemplating military action, responded, "We should
have learned from Vietnam that it is easier to get into a war
than to get out of it. I am not saying that there's no circumstance
where we would not use force. But it is one thing to use it in the
case of a dispute over price; it's another where there is some ac-
tual strangulation of the industrialized world."178
Professional analysts see two contingencies as having the po-
tential to bring about a U.S. military seizure of Arab oil fields:
1. A failure to achieve a solution to the devastating eco-
nomic consequence of the enormous increase in oil prices dur-
ing the past year; or
2. A new Arab embargo on petroleum exports, which could
push the West's sluggish economies into a depression accom-
panied by widespread hardship,
(a) as a result of another Mideast war between Arab and
Israeli forces; or
(b) as an attempt to induce Israeli territorial conces-
sions. 179
Nevertheless, military intervention is viewed as a last re-
sort18° to be employed only if economic and diplomatic measures
fail to bring down the price of oil or end a new Arab embargo.
One of the primary considerations for elected officials in a
democracy is domestic public opinion. Only 10 percent of Amer-
cans surveyed in a recent Gallup Poll believed that the United
States should resort to military intervention should the Arabs im-
pose another oil boycott.181 The moral conscience of the Ameri-
can people in recent decades has been marked by opposition to
the acquisition of territory by force. Territory under American
control has been surrendered on several occasions in favor of the
principle of self-determination (for example, Cuba, the Phillipines,
fast land ships and fast freighters. Finally, the expedition would be reinforced
with the combat echelons of a second Marine division. "Except for staging
and refueling points in Israel - itself almost 1,000 miles away (Hatserim to
Dhahran) - there would be no friendly bases within easy reach. The Israelis
owe a great deal to the United States, and it is inconceivable that they would
deny airfield facilities, even if the operation entailed serious risks for them."
Ignotus, Seizing Arab Oil, HARPER'S, Feb. 1975, at 44.
178 Kissinger on Oil, Food, and Trade, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 13, 1975, at 69.
179 Quoted in Will U.S. Seize Mideast Oil? U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 2, 1974, at 18.
110 Secretary of State Kissinger has mentioned the use of force as a last step
in the event of a "grave emergency" over petroleum. See N.Y. Times, Jan.
3, 1975, at 2, col. 1.
181 Supra note 162.
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West Germany, Austria, Italy and Japan). American war weari-
ness, a by-product of U.S. involvement in Indo-China, might
also account for the high percentage of Americans opposing mili-
tary intervention. "If Vietnam was full of trees and brave men,
and the national interest was almost invisible, here there are no
trees, very few men, and a clear objective. There could be seri-
ous risks in the operation, but at least there would be no sense of
futility with 200 billion barrels of oil underfoot - oil that would re-
store jobs to the unemployed and supply the wherewithal for a
gradual program of substitution."182 Starving, unemployed
Americans might support whatever measures necessary to reverse
economic "strangulation." Nevertheless, a mood of isolationism
appears to be sweeping the United States. Congress has placed
severe restraints upon the ability of the Executive to commit
American troops abroad in a foreign military conflict. 8 3  In
the wake of the disaster of Vietnam, Americans no longer feel
determined to restrain the spread of communism. Congressional
action with respect to Angola *indicates that not only will this
nation refuse to send its young men to fight in a foreign war,
but it will also refuse to lend even relatively miniscule financial
support to those who themselves desire the means with which to
resist Soviet-Cuban interventionist neo-colonialism. Congress
has permitted the relative military strength of the United States
to deteriorate;184 and President Carter called for the withdrawal
182 Supra note 123, at 51.
183 Prior to the Vietnam War, United States Presidents had sent troops
abroad into armed conflict on 125 occasions, all of which occured without
Congressional approval. Lynch, An Inquiry into the Law of War and Warfare,
7 TEX. INT'L L. J. 481, 493 (1972). See Note, Presidential Power to Make War, 7
INDIANA L. REV. 900 (1974); Note, 1973 War Powers Legislation: Congress Re-
Asserts Its Warmaking Power, 5 LOYOLA U. L. J. 83 (1974). See also L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-65 and 102-104 (1972).
184 The 4-to-I advantage the United States held a decade ago in strategic
missiles and bombers has disappeared. Today, the USSR has 2,537 long-range
bombers and missiles, compared to 2,142 for the United States.
Since 1970, the United States has reduced the size of its armed forces by
900,000, while the Soviet Union has expanded its by 270,000. Today, the Soviet
Union has 3,575,000 troops compared to 2,130,000 for the United States. Soviet
spending represents 15 percent of their gross national product, compared to only
5 percent for the United States. Back to the Cold War? U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 26, 1976, at 25. See Schlesinger Sees U.S. Heading for Disaster, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1975, at 22; Fewer American Servicemen on Guard
Around the World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 29, 1975, at 20; Putting
Military Spending in Perspective, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1975, at 21;
Where Russia Is Outstripping U.S. in Military Might, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Feb. 9, 1976, at 20. See As U.S.-Russia Showdown Nears Over Angola, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 19, 1976, at 22; Moscow's Risky Bid for Influence, TIME,
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of American troops from South Korea during his campaign. 185
The United States is quite a different nation than it was prior to
its defeat in Indo-China.
Initial world public opinion would, to say the least, indicate
vehement opposition to a U.S. military seizure of Arab oil fields.
The Soviet Union might use it as an excuse to seize West Berlin,
or Finland, or beyond. However, industrialists and labor in Ja-
pan and Europe would be delighted that their factories are run-
ning again. The Fourth World, whose economic progress has
been crippled by the incredibly inflated price of petroleum, and
whose millions will starve because of the diminished production
of fertilizers, might eventually be delighted to receive oil at pre-
1973 prices or lower.
Finally, from a purely military standpoint, some strategic
planners indicate that an operation to seize Arab oil fields poses
no insurmountable obstacles for United States armed forces, par-
ticularly since the United States has established a naval pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean with the construction of naval facilities
on the British island of Diego Garcia. An assessment recently
published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute arrives at this conclusion: "Obviously, a powerful country
such as the United States would have little difficulty in conquer-
ing most the countries in the Middle East. Successful military
control over the Arabian-Persian Gulf area could probably be
achieved in hours, or even minutes. The problem would be in
sustaining such an. operation and managing its repercussions."
Three nations are pinpointed by military experts as potential
targets for an armed action: Libya, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
However, some authorities maintain that the current oil produc-
tion of Libya and Kuwait is inadequate to cope with an inter-
national economic crisis of the scope that could trigger military
action. Daily output in Kuwait is approximately 2 million bar-
rels and in Libya 1.4 million. That would be sufficient to meet
U.S. import demands, but would not supply the minimum im-
port requirements of Western Europe. Saudi Arabia, with daily
output of over 8 million barrels, is the only nation that could
produce enough petroleum to meet the essential needs of both
Europe and America. Military planners indicate 'that three divi-
Jan. 9, 1976, at 46; The Battle Over Angola, TIME, Dec. 29, 1975, at 7; A Tiger
At the Back Door, TIME, Feb. 9, 1976, at 34; Ottaway, How U.S. Ally in Angola
Became a Spectacular Failure, Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1976, at A-12, col. 1.
I'Sjimmy Carter: Not Just Peanuts, TIME, Mar. 8, 1976, at 20.
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sions would be sufficient to seize the oil fields in any of these
three countries. 186
Setting aside all moral considerations, such a course of action
would undoubtedly carry with it a cataclysmic risk. Military ac-
tion might well induce a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation and
thereby ignite a third World War. The Soviet Union could de-
ploy a naval flotilla off the Saudi Arabian coast, or move mine-
sweepers into the Straits of Hermuz, or land troops in Iraq. How-
ever, at least one high-level U.S. policy maker has discounted
the risk of Soviet intervention, arguing that the Soviets would
recognize that the American military intervention in Arab oil
States involved vital U.S. interests and only marginal Russian
interests. Therefore, he argues the Soviets would stand aside -
just as we did in Czechoslovakia where we recognized that Soviet
national interests were at stake.
Nevertheless, it may well be true that, in a nuclear age, the
survival of man depends upon adherence to existing principles of
international law.
2. Legal Limitations on the Use of Force
During the 18th and 19th centuries, and the first two decades
of the 20th, a State could resort to war for any reason it deemed
proper, and international law was not thereby violated187 How-
ever, in 1928, recourse to war for the solution of international dis-
putes was condemned in the Kellog-Briand Pact, and war was
renounced as an instrument of national policy 88  Since then,
condemnation of the settlement of controversies between States
by other than pacific means has been reaffirmed by the commu-
nity of nations on a number of occasions 89
Clearly, the weight of current international law, as expressed
in numerous U.N. resolutions, prohibits the occupation and ac-
186 Will U.S. Seize Mideast Oil?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1974,
at 19. See generally M. WILLRICH, ENERGY AND WORLD POLITICS 94-102 (1975).
187 During the time of Grotius, a distinction was drawn between "just" and
"unjust" wars. W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAW 913 (1962).
18 Kellog-Briand "Pacts of Paris," Aug. 27, 1928, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2343,
4 Malloy (Trenwith) Treaties 5130, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
189 See League of Nations Covenant, articles 12, 13, 15 and 16; see also
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
The Nurnberg Charter was unanimously affirmed by the U.N. General As-
sembly. G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/236 at 1144 (1946).
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quisition of the territory of another State by force,19° war1 91 or
military conquest.92 Moreover, existing principles of interna-
tional law prohibit the use of force in the relations between States.
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations solemnly de-
clares:
All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other matter
inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations.
This principle of international law was recently reaffirmed in
paragraph 1 of the Declaration on Friendly Relations.193 A
number of other principles contained in the Declaration would
also be violated by a U.S. military seizure of Arab oil fields.
For example, paragraph 4 prohibits the ". . . use of force to vio-
late the existing international boundaries of another State." Para-
graph 6 proclaims the duty "to refrain from acts of reprisal in-
volving the use of force."194 Also, the military occupation and
acquisition by force of the territory of another State is prohibited
by paragraph 10.19 However, paragraph 13 clearly indicates
that the right of lawful self-defense as contained in the U.N.
Charter is in no way inhibited by the Declaration on Friendly
190 See G.A. Res. 2628, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 5, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2799, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 82, U.N. Doc.
A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2949, 27 U.N. GAOR Part I, at 24, U.N. Doc.
A/4548 (1972).
191 See 22 U.N. SCOR, Res. 242, at 8 (1967).
192 See 23 U.N. SCOR, Res. 252, at 8-12 (1968); 24 U.N. SCOR, Res.
267, at 4 (1969); 24 U.N. SCOR, Res. 271, at 5 (1969); 26 U.N. SCOR, Res.
298, at 6 (1971).
193 Declarations on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970), 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 243 (1971). Former Secretary of State
Dean Rusk has suggested that the wording of the Declaration on Friendly
Relations supports the view of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as jus cogens.
Rusk, The 25th UN General Assembly and the Use of Force, 2 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 19, 21 (Supp. 1) (1972). The fact that the Declaration on Friendly
Relations, as an interpretation of the U. N. Charter, was adopted by the General
Assembly by acclamation without dissent (although without formal vote) may
also lend support to the view of the Declaration as jus cogens.
194 Thus, retaliation against injuries which do not permit the exercise of
the right of self-defense is prohibited. Reprisals were also condemned by a
Resolution of the Security Council of April 9, 1964, as incompatible with the
purposes of the United Nations. Rusk, supra note 193, at 26.
195 The forcible military occupation of the territory of another State is also
violative of the Declaration on Strengthening of International Security. G.A.
Res. 2734, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 22-24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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Relations. Therefore, unless the United States could lawfully
assert the right of self-defense, U.S. military intervention against
Arab oil producers would clearly be prohibited by the above
principles of international law.
3. National Self-Defense Under Article 51
Normal difficulties in delineating legitimate responses to coer-
cion have been compounded by the regime of nonviolence contem-
plated by the framers of the United Nations Charter. Under the
Charter, the primary responsibility for peace-keeping has been
vested in the Security Council, with limited utilization of defensive
force reserved for the State which suffers an assault.""-
Under the U.N. Charter, recourse to force is permitted in
only two instances: (a) Within the framework of the collective
security system created by the United Nations, and (b) in self-
defense in response to an armed attack, in accordance with Article
51 of the Charter, which provides that: "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual and collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member . . ."
Admittedly there is a strong school of thought adhering to the
view that Article 51 explicitly condones only one type of legitimate
self-defense (that is, the repulsion of an armed attack) 197 with-
out negating other types preexisting under customary internation-
al law (that is, resistance to aggression in its several manifesta-
tions). 198
The phrase "if an armed attack occurs" is open to two inter-
pretations. It may be argued that the proviso is a restraint on the
traditional right of self-defense so that the right is presently avail-
able to only those U.N. members who are the objects of an actual
armed attack. 199  Professor Kunz, for example, argues that the
196 A. TUSSING, TOWARD A RATIONAL POLICY FOR OIL AND GAS IMPORTS
391 (1974).
197 The controversial phrase is, of course, "if an armed attack occurs."
One need only recall the agony imposed upon those who attempted to defend
President Kennedy's interdiction of the shipment of missiles to Cuba to grasp
some sense of the complexities involved. See Mallison, Jr., Limited Naval
Blockade or Quarantine-Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid
Under International Law, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 335 (1965); Oliver, International
Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 373 (1963); Campbell, The
Cuban Crisis and the U.N. Charter: An Analysis of the United States Position, 16
STAN. L. REV. 160 (1963).
198 See Dinstein, supra note 168, at 468; D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 187-192 (1958); M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 232-241 (1961).
199 See D. Bowett id., at 187.
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right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter does not
exist against any form of aggression which does not constitute an
"armed attack":
As in municipal law, self-defense under Article 51 is not a
procedure to enforce the law, is not designed to punish the ag-
gressor or to obtain indemnities, is not an enforcement action
by the United Nations, but serves primarily to repel an illegal
armed attack. But, contrary to municipal law, it may not stop
here: it seems to give the State or States exercising the right
of individual or collective self-defense the right to resort to ajustified war, to carry this war to victory, to impose a peace
treaty upon the vanquished aggressor, always presupposing that
the Security Council has failed and continues to fail of taking
the measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. The right of self-defense is, in such cases, a right to
resort to war. . . It seems also that the conditions of neces-
sity, reasonableness, and a certain proportionality, which the
municipal law prescribes for the exercise of the right of self-
defense, are lacking in Article 51.
Self-defense in municipal law presupposes an illegal at-
tack; this is certainly true also in international law.
"Armed attack" as the only condition of the right of self-
defense under Article 51 may, in conceivable circumstances,
mean to [sic] little. For this right does not exist against any
form of aggression which does not constitute "armed attack."
. . . The threat of aggression does not justify self-defense under
Article 51."
Professor Kelsen also argues that Article 51 restricts the right
of self-defense to the case of an "armed attack" actually made by
one State against another. He asserts, "Self-defense . . . is self-
help against the illegal use of force, not against other violations
of the law. " 201  These authorities contend that the combined ef-
fect of Article 2(4) and Article 51 is to restrict the right of self-
defense to cases falling precisely within the wording of Article
51 - making that Article the exclusive source of authority of
legitimate recourse to war, so that any "threat or use of force"
not within its terms is a violation of Article 2(4). 202 Under
this interpretation, the combination of Article 2(4) and 51 would
render all use of force illegal except in the exercise of self-defense
"if an armed attack occurs." 20 3  Thus, Article 51 would be
2 Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 872, 876-877 (1947).
21 Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of
the United Nations, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 784 (1948).
2o2 See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 417 (1963).
2 See supra note 40, at 265.
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construed as a restriction on the traditional right of self-defense,
so that the right could not be exercised in the case of a violation
of a Member's legally protected interests except with those Mem-
bers who are the object of an actual armed attack.20
Indeed, some scholars assert that Article 51 demands an
even higher degree of necessity than does customary interna-
tional law for the characterization of coercion as permissible self-
defense, in that it limits justifying necessity to an "armed attack"
as distinguished from applications of nonmilitary types of intense
coercion. One scholar, Dr. Niici6, specifically asserts that
economic aggression does not warrant armed action on the basis
of Article 51. 205 Certainly, because the employment of the Arab
oil weapon in an embargo of petroleum, and the resultant "strangu-
lation" of Western economies would not constitute an "armed
attack", Article 51 would be inapplicable. Moreover, a resort to
force against various forms of indirect aggression (including
economic aggression) could not be derived from Article 51 if the
requirement of proportionality is observed.2 However, a nar-
row reading of Article 51 would seem to constitute an under-
estimation of the potentialities of contemporary techniques of
nonmilitary coercion. 2°7
However, this interpretation complies neither with the letter 2°8
nor the spirit of the Charter, and consequently has been rejected
by most authorities. 2° 9  The weight of authority appears to in-
terpret Article 51 as precluding preventive countermeasures which
may have been legitimate under customary international law.
21 0
These scholars assert that the source of the right of self-defense
is not the U.N. Charter, but is an independent and inherent
right rooted in general international law; and the purpose of
Article 51 was to remove all possible doubts as to its survival after
promulgation of the Charter.211 They argue that U.N. members
continue to possess those sovereign and inherent rights which
2 Supra note 30, at 187.
2D Supra note 31, at 233.
20 Supra note 40, at 279.
27 Supra note 31, at 238.
28 Although the English and Spanish texts use "armed attack" and ataque
armado respectively, the equally authentic French text utilizes the clearer term
agression militaire.
29 See Kunz, supra note 100, at 887-888; Dinstein, supra note 168, at 468;
H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 797-798 (1950).
210 See A. TUSSING, supra note 196, at 391.
211 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 417 (1963).
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general international law accords to them, except and insofar as
they have been assumed under the Charter.213 Thus, each mem-
ber retains the inherent right of self-defense subject only to such
limitations as are contained in the Charter.214 Because it is well
recognized under traditional international law that an armed at-
tack is not the only form of aggression which so imperils a State's
rights so that it may be compelled to resort to the exercise of a
right of self-defense,2 15 a military response to intense economic
coercion may well be permissible under customary international
law.
The U.N. Charter expressly permits the use of force in only
two instances: (1) Individual or collective self-defense, and (2)
implementation of a decision by a competent international or-
ganization.2 16 The Charter was originally interpreted as a some-
what absolutist document, prescribing the elimination of aggressive
force.217 Those scholars who assert that the U.N. Charter pro-
hibits all forms of self-defense other than Article 51 self-defense
would be entirely justified to prohibit the use of force if the
United Nations or collective security organs had either estab-
lished the collective machinery to oppose aggression; or could and
would respond quickly on an ad hoc basis. But, for the most part,
this machinery does not exist. War between nations did not end
when the U.N. Charter was signed in San Francisco. Despite
the hopes of its founders, the United Nations, as an organ of
collective international security, has been impotent (with the ex-
ception of certain fortuitous circumstances surrounding U.N.
military involvement in Korea). Moreover, to reject the right of
self-defense in contexts not involving overt violence, under cer-
tain circumstances, may require the target State to assume a
suicidal posture. 218
The "legislative history" of the U.N. Charter appears to favor the
position held by the latter group of scholars. The travaux prepara-
toires, to which one may legitimately resort in the case of am-
biguity, suggests only that Article 51 should safeguard the existing
212 Supra note 30, at 185.
213 Supra note 40, at 272.
214 Supra note 30, at 193.
215 Id. at 192.
216 Lillich, Forcible Self-Help Under International Law, 22 NAVAL WAR COL. REV.
56 (1970).
217 Id. at 57.
218 Supra note 31, at 202-03.
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right of self-defense and not restrict it.219 The preparatory work
on the Charter clearly indicates that Article 51 was not drafted
for the purpose of deliberately narrowing the permissibility of
self-defense under customary international law against an un-
lawful attack where the required degree of necessity exists.
Moreover, in the process of formulating the prohibition of uni-
lateral coercion contained in Article 2(4), the drafters indicated
that the traditional permissibility of self-defense was not intended
to be abridged or attenuated but, to the contrary, preserved and
maintained.m Further, under principles of traditional inter-
national law, restrictions on the inherent rights of a sovereign
State are not lightly to be presumed. 221
Therefore, assuming that the U.N. Charter does not limit
the preexisting inherent right of self-defense held by sovereign
nations, it is appropriate now to examine the permissibility of a
military response to intense economic coercion under principles
of customary international law.
4. The Customary International Law of Self-Defense
As a principle of international law, the right of self-defense
has never been seriously- disputed.2 This privilege was
deemed so fundamental that a reservation of the right of legiti-
mate defense was made a condition precedent to the signing of
the Kellog-Briand Pact. 223  Moreover, it is clear that under
customary international law the right of self-defense was not
limited to cases of an actual armed attack.224
The prerequisites of customary international law for the lawful
assertion of a claim of self-defense are most commonly sum-
marized by the terms "necessity" and "proportionality."225
Often these restrictions have been cast in such rigid phraseology
so as to make the privilege unassertable. The traditional formu-
lation of the principle is found in the oft-quoted words of Secre-
tary of State Webster in the Caroline case of 1842. There he
said, "While it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the
219 Supra note 30, at 188.
2 Supra note 31, at 235.
221 Supra note 30, at 188.
222 Weightman, Self-Defense in International Law, 37 VA. L. REV. 1095, 1114
(1951).
223 Supra note 40, at 235; see supra hote 53, at 1108.
224 Supra note 199, at 188.
225 Supra note 31, at 217.
[Vol. 9: 205
ECONOMIC AGGRESSION
great law of self-defense do exist, those exceptions should be con-
fined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no
moment for deliberation." 221 A more widely accepted defimi-
tion of the principle of proportionality was articulated by de
Brouck~re in 1927, who said, "Legitimate defense implies the
adoption of measures proportionate to the seriousness of the at-
tack and justified by the imminence of the danger. "227
Under both formulations, it would appear that a resort to
military force might be disproportionate to harm suffered from
economic aggression, and might therefore be illegal. Directly
after World War II, the question of the legality of the use of force
in self-defense in response to economic injury was placed before
the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The Tribunal
rejected the contention that Japanese military operations against
The Netherlands, Great Britain, France, and the United States
were justifiable, as within the privilege of self-defense because
those nations took economic measures against Japan, and that
as a result, she was forced to go to war to preserve the welfare and
prosperity of her nationals.228
Thus, the requirement of proportionality will generally pro-
hibit the lawful use of force in response to economic aggression.
This need not be so inevitably; one may recall the statement
made by the United Kingdom with respect to Article 4 of the
Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States to the ef-
fect that exceptions to the duty of nonintervention may exist
where a State is "pursuing a course which leads to the economic
strangulation of another State." However, situations in which
self-defense would justify the employment of forceful means
against a wrongful action not involving the use of force would
certainly be rare, and the defending State would be put to the
most stringent standard of proof as to the necessity of the case,
the lack of alternative means of protection, and the proportionate
nature of the reaction. 229
Nevertheless, the interest which a State may have in the
preservation of its national economy and its essential economic
interests may be equally as compelling as its interest in safe-
2 2 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-414 (1906). See Jennings, The
Caroline and MacLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
227 Supra note 31, at 261.
m Supra note 40, at 253.
221 Supra note 30, at 110.
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guarding its territory, its political independence, or its people.23
Thus, if as a result of a prolonged embargo of petroleum by Arab
nations, most of the world's factories grind to a halt without fuel,
and mass unemployment and starvation results, such devastation
would be at least as economically catastrophic as if industrial
complexes had been bombed.
Customary international law has always required a high
degree of necessity to support the lawfulness of a response of
force. One index of the required condition of necessity is the
degree of opportunity of effective recourse to nonviolent modes of
adjustment and response. Certainly, a prerequisite to the use of
force against Arab oil producers would be the exhaustion of non-
violent alternatives. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger empha-
sized, " . . . the use of force would be considered only in the
greatest emergency. ' '231
As has been indicated, the legal obstacles to a U.S. military
seizure of Arab oil fields are numerous, complex and possibly
fatal. One must first determine whether the fact that economic
coercion has not been generally accepted as within the definition
of aggression is of significance in giving rise to the right of self-
defense. Secondly, one must ponder the issue of whether the
prohibitions against the use of force in response to economic
aggression implied in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter
prohibit the use of force against intense economic coercion under
customary international law. Once these two obstacles have
been surmounted, one must determine whether the use of force
under circumstances in which the U.S. economy is faced with
'strangulation" would be permissible under existing principles of
international law.
The use of force in self-defense is permissible for the purpose
of protecting the security of a State and its essential rights - in
particular the rights of territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence - upon which that security depends. Customary interna-
tional law imposes the three following conditions upon the lawful
assertion of the use of force in self-defense:
1. The target State must be guilty of a prior international
delinquency against the claimant State.
2. An attempt by the claimant State to obtain redress or
protection by other means must be known to have been made,
and failed, or to be inappropriate or impossible in the circum-
stances.
230 id. at 106.
231 Supra note 178.
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3. The claimant's use of force must be limited to the neces-
sities of the case and proportionate to the wrong done by the
target State. 32
The case for the necessity of the use of force would be more
convincing if asserted by Japan or Western Europe, whose in-
dustrialized economies are overwhelmingly dependent upon
imported petroleum, than if made by the United States, which
imports only between 30 and 40 percent of its oil consumption.
However, within the next decade, U.S. dependency upon imported
crude will increase significantly, as will its satisfaction of the
legal requirement of necessity.
It is extremely doubtful, however, that a military response to
economic coercion would be deemed proportionate to the harm
done and therefore acceptable under existing principles of inter-
national law. But before 1973, the world had never been faced
with a situation in which a handful of nations could thrust the
world into a depression by withholding a single commodity.
One final issue which should be mentioned is the legality of
the acquisition of territory in self-defense. Force employed in
self-defense, although lawful, must be proportionate to the threat
of immediate danger; where the threat has been averted the plea
of self-defense is no longer available. Thus, a State cannot there-
by acquire title to the resources and territory of the attacker by
conquest in lawful self-defense.233
Realistically, one must face the possibility that if the United
States finds itself between a rock and a hard place, it may not be
deterred by the impermissibility of military intervention under ex-
isting principles of international law. As Senator Scott (R-Pa.)
said recently, "If in this country automobiles ground to a halt
and people couldn't get to work, if the temperature in people's
homes dropped to 50 degrees, if the wheels of industry ground to
a halt, and we couldn't employ people, I can't imagine this coun-
try not doing whatever it needed to do, either economic or military
[sic] to permit itself to survive, and we wouldn't be worth a damn
as a nation if we didn't." 234 Commenting on the Cuban missile
crisis, former Secretary of State Acheson said, "The power, posi-
tion and prestige of the United States had been challenged by an-
232 Supra note 170, at 3.
233 R. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55
(1963).
234 U.S. Getting Tough on Oil?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 1975,
at 21.
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other State; and law simply does not deal with such questions of
ultimate power. . . . I cannot believe that there are principles of
law that say we must accept destruction of our way of life ...
The survival of States is not a matter of law."235
V. THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS
The international energy arena appears to be dominated by
five factors: (a) The cartel of oil exporting countries, (b) the
political volatility of Southwest Asia, (c) the precarious nature
of the world monetary system, (d) the ominous repercussions of
the energy crisis upon poor countries, and (e) the global nature of
certain environmental problems. 236
A. Emerging Petropolitics
It has been suggested that ecopolitics is replacing geopolitics
as the prime mover in the affairs of nations. With the industrial
nations of the world actively competing for the same petroleum
resources, and with the exporting nations employing oil to amass
unprecedented wealth and political power, petropolitics is begin-
ning to dominate both ecopolitics and geopolitics.2 37
American recognition of the essentiality of energy resources is
long overdue.
There is no more certain way of destroying any economy
- except the most primitive - than by depriving it of energy.
Industrial society depends entirely on a steady, secure supply of
ample energy for its maintenance and growth. Aspirations for
higher standards of living, achievement of social goals, and eco-
nomic as well as military security - all depend on the availabil-
ity of needed energy reserves. 238
The American energy appetite is the world's most profligate.
Consumption of energy in the United States doubled between 1950
and 1960, and will double again by 1985. With only 6 percent of
the world's population, the United States consumes approximate-
235 Supra note 187, at 929.
236 ENERGY POLICY PROJECT OF THE FORD FOUNDATION, EXPLORING ENERGY
CHOICES 16 (1974).
237 A. RIBICOFF, PETROPOLITICS AND THE AMERICAN ENERGY SHORTAGE 4
(1973). For a succinct appraisal of the theory of geopolitics expounded by
Dr. Karl Haushofer, see T. WALLBANK & A. SCHRIER, LIVING WORLD HISTORY 642
(2d ed. 1964).
238 B. ABRAHMSSON & J. STECKLER, STRATEGIC ASPECTS OF SEABORNE OIL
5 (1973).
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ly one-third of the world's energy and over one-half of all the
gasoline produced.
The most outstanding feature of the U.S. energy consumption
pattern is the nation's reliance on oil. Approximately 45 percent
of the energy consumed in the United States comes from oil, and
32 percent from natural gas, largely a byproduct of oil production.
Of the remainder, 18 percent comes from coal, 4 percent from
hydroelectric power, and only .5 percent from nuclear plants.239
During the winter of 1973-74, petroleum became scarce in the
United States because domestic production has declined since
1970, and the international market, already dominated by the in-
fluence of the OPEC cartel, became devastated by the Arab cut-
offs resulting from the Mideast war. m  Nevertheless, the ef-
fects of the embargo were constrained by (a) the availability of
domestic reserves, (b) the importation of oil from non-OAPEC
sources, and (c) the inability of Arab nations effectively to con-
trol the destination of ocean vessels laden with petroleum. With
the nationalization and acquisition of wellhead producing and re-
fining facilities heretofore held by the controlling oil corporations
(which, predominantly, were domiciled in the United States), the
ability of the involved States to effectively impose a destination
embargo upon oil has been significantly augmented. More-
over, with the realization of the enormous economic and political
potential of petroleum manipulation, the Arab States are becom-
ing more acutely aware of the alternative economic weaponry at
their disposal, and, perhaps, more sophisticated in its utiliza-
tion. For example, one source has compiled a list of intriguing
types of economic coercive measures which could readily be em-
ployed by oil-exporting nations to achieve their desired ends.
The negative weapons include:
1. Withholding part or all of the oil supply from all or se-
lected customers through (a) nationalization or threat of take-
over of oil and/or other foreign investments, and (b) tempo-
rary embargoes on exports;
2. Using its "embargo" power to demand and receive
increasingly higher prices for crude oil - naturally to the ex-
tent that consumer resistance, the development of substitutes,
and retaliatory measures by the oil-importing countries (e.g.,
239 A. Riaicop, supra note 237, at 3; see H.P. DREWRY LIMITED, U.S. OIL
IMPORTS 1971-1985 (1973).
240 B. COOPER, AN ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE ENERGY EMERGENCY 1
(1973); see O'Toole, Saudis to Pay $1.5 Billion for Rest of Aramco, Wash. Post,
Mar. 24, 1976, at A-2, col. 1.
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import quotas, foreign investment restrictions, denial of aid,
and other retaliation) may permit;
3. Regulating domestic operation by foreign oil com-
panies through such requirements as greater local participa-
tion in production and/or distribution; further changes in in-
ternal "value-added" taxes on oil production and marketing;
and increased local purchases, restricted company imports,
etc.;
4. Switching huge export earnings from some foreign cur-
rencies and countries to others depending on type of coopera-
tion and attitude, or denying foreign investment in "hostile"
countries;
5. Making discriminatory price concessions, or engaging
in unfavorable price discrimination vis-a-vis selected customers,
or dumping other export products in "unfriendly" countries;
6. Retaliating against industrialized creditors by the re-
pudiation or rescheduling of foreign debts; and
7. Shifting alliances and coalitions in trade, investment
and military agreements between cooperative and non-coop-
erative nations (including threats of withdrawing from mem-
bership of regional pacts or closing military bases),AI
On the other hand, the means of affirmative reinforcement
available to oil-producing States include:
1. Giving special concessions to foreign private investors
for the purposes of exploiting domestic national resources which
are outside the scope of existing contracts;
2. Promising cooperation in the reform of international
monetary, fiscal and trade systems; and
3. Investing in joint ventures for the development of energy
sources and/or other investment projects with cooperative
and accommodating partners. 24 2
What is the ability of the oil-producing nations to maintain
their enormous economic and political influence in the world com-
munity?
The question may be unanswerable, because the world has had
no experience either with high oil prices or with a cartel of fman-
cially solvent governments who control a nonagricultural, nonre-
newable commodity for which there is no short-run substitute.
The most immediate foreign policy problem vis-a-vis oil impor-
tation which the United States will face during the next decade
will consist of attempting to reduce its vulnerability to politically
motivated oil cutoffs, particularly should the fundamental Arab-
Israeli conflict remain unresolved. By 1985, U.S. importation
241 Amuzegar, supra note 8, at 227-228.
242 Id.
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from Arab nations may well increase to 6 million barrels of oil per
day.
Nations which are dependent upon world markets for agricul-
tural products and industrial raw materials are vulnerable to vari-
ous forms of coercive economic activity, including embargoes.
Curiously, Fourth World agrarian States, although more suscept-
ible to military coercion, may be substantially less vulnerable to
economic coercion than are industrialized States. Nevertheless,
the Fourth World may find it increasingly difficult to absorb
substantially higher costs of imported commodities which have
heretofore and will henceforth arise owing to artificial economic
manipulative measures taken by the world's cartels in an effort to
increase the wealth of their members.
B. The Massive Shift of Wealth to Arab Nations
The world oil market, an artery of American, Western Euro-
pean and Japanese prosperity, has undergone an extraordinary
metamorphis in only 4 years. During that period, the oil-ex-
porting nations (representing only a fraction of the world's
population, income and military might) acquired an almost unlim-
ited control of world oil prices. During the first 4 years of 1970,
the price of oil rose approximately 515 percent.
The world has experienced more than a mere temporary aber-
ration in supply and demand; it has witnessed instead a fundamen-
tal shift in the power relationships between the world's indus-
trialized nations (for example, the United States) and the primary
petroleum exporting nations (for example, Saudi Arabia, Iran and
Kuwait). Its implications will have far-reaching effects upon
American diplomacy. I
The two massive increases in the cost of oil during 1973 were
the culmination of a dramatic shift of bargaining power from the
oil-consuming to the oil-producing nations. In the West, this
revolution was viewed, quite naturally, as a disaster; and in the
OPEC States it was perceived to be a triumphant conclusion
of a 20-year struggle for a fair return on a diminishing natural
resource.243
With the per barrel price of oil escalating from $2.10 in late
1973, to a cost which presently exceeds $10.00, petroleum produc-
ing nations have accumulated enormous cash reserves. The cost
of imported oil to the United States alone increased from $7.7
243 M. FIELD, A HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS A DAY 17 (1975).
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billion in 1973 to $24.0 billion in 1974.24 Robert S. McNamara,
President of the World Bank, has estimated that OPEC nations
have already accumulated a surplus of $60 billion in investment
capital, and may eventually hold as much as $750 billion.245
Prior to the recent oil price increases, former Commerce Secre-
tary Peter Peterson estimated that Arab oil producers could hold
dollar surpluses of $300 billion by 1980 - a sum equal to 20 times
the value of General Motors. If such transfers of wealth con-
tinue, it is estimated that 70 percent of the world's monetary re-
serves might eventually be held by Arab oil producers. By 1985,
oil-producing nations may well have accumulated cash reserves
of $1.2 trillion. The Economist of London has calculated that
members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
are acquiring capital at the rate of $115,000 a second - fast enough
to purchase the Bank of America. in 6 days, IBM in 143 days,
and all of the companies listed on the world's major stock ex-
changes in 15.5 years.24  The Economist described the financial
crisis in the gravest terms, stating: "A landslide of historic pro-
portions is rumbling downhill toward most of the oil-consuming
industrialized world, in the shape of the immense balance-of-
payments surplus acquired by the producers of oil - a landslide
capable of breaking the financial system and the economies of
several major countries." 24  In an industrialized world depen-
dent upon petroleum for economic stability, the Arab oil embargo
and OPEC's sharp increase in oil prices has created a financial
crisis of unparalleled gravity. The threat posed to industrialized
nations was described in these words by Arthur Burns, Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board: "No economic event in a long
generation, excluding only wartime upheavals, has so seriously
disrupted our economy as the manipulation of oil prices and sup-
244 Pay More, Get Less: Oil-Gas Outlook, U.S NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan.
27, 1975, at 25. Moreover, the current price of approximately $11.50 per barrel
is expected to rise despite the inflationary and balance-of-payments crises created,
see Why the Price of Mideast Oil Is Likely to Go Up Again, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Jan. 12, 1976, at 51. More recent increases in the price of oil have been
far more moderate. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed to
increase petroleum prices by only 5 percent, despite the decision of the remaining
11 OPEC nations to increase prices by 15 percent. See The Saudis Break Ranks,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 1976, at 27.
24s Washington Whispers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 23, 1974, at 5.
See Dempsey, Legal and Economic Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment
in the Southeastern United States, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 247 (1976). Cumula-
tive petroleum revenues will reach at least $800 billion by the end of this century.
M. ISKANDAR, THE ARAB OIL QUESTION 35 (1975).
247 Supra note 179.
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plies over the past year . . . A great cloud of uncertainty now
surrounds the economic future of nations around the world. '"248
Secretary of State Kissinger expressed the concern of this nation
by emphasizing that we are "confronted with an unprecedented
challenge to our prosperity and to the entire structure of inter-
national cooperation.
. . . The impact of the energy crisis raises fundamental ques-
tions about the future of developing countries, the prospects for
economic growth for all nations, and the hopes for global stabil-
ity . . .
Indeed, the world's poorest nations have suffered most from
the quintupling of oil prices since the fall of 1973. The aggre-
gate balance-of-payments deficit of non-OPEC developing na-
tions ballooned from $11.3 billion in 1973 to approximately $42
billion last year. A primary reason for this deficit is that these
nations are now paying $13 billion more per year for oil than they
paid in 1973. Developing nations may well require approximately
$20 billion annually in capital assistance throughout the rest of
the 1970's.2
C. Cartelization in the Third World
Cartels have never been known for their longevity. Histori-
cally, either the participants unilaterally made lower price agree-
ments with purchasers in order to secure a larger share of the mar-
ket, or new suppliers, attracted by high prices, entered the market
and undercut the cartel's power of monopolization.
The durability of the OPEC cartel should not however, be
underestimated. No new significant suppliers of oil are visible
on the horizon. Meanwhile, Western Europe continues to be de-
248 Is There Any Way to Beat the Arabs at Their Money Game?, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP., Dec. 16, 1974, at 60.
249 Major Oil-Consuming Countries Meet at Washington to Discuss the Energy
Problem, 70 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 201 (1974).
2s0 OPEC oil ministers, meeting in Paris, recently agreed to establish an
$800 million fund for 1 year to make long-term, interest-free loans to less-
developed nations - OPEC's first gesture as a group to assist poor nations
which are afflicted with enormous oil bills. Oil-exporting nations have refused
to provide their poorest customers with a price reduction, preferring to assist
through direct grants and loans and investment in agencies such as the World
Bank. Yet, almost two-thirds of direct OPEC assistance during 1974 and 1975
was given to Egypt and Syria. Indeed, less than 10 percent of OPEC direct
assistance is given to non-Moslem nations, and 18 of the 42 countries designated
by the United Nations as "most seriously affected" by high oil prices have
received no aid at all from OPEC members. Ungenerous OPEC, TIME, Feb. 9,
1976, at 76.
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pendent upon the Middle East for 70 percent of its oil, and Japan
imports 40 percent of its consumption from the region. Addi-
tionally, Middle Eastern leaders are convinced that it is economically
prudent to prolong the life of their nonrenewable resources by
reducing production.251
The initiative for the formation of cartels and other price-
increasing arrangements has traditionally arisen in developing
States which feel that they have not received equitable economic
treatment in the past. It is almost universally recognized that
henceforth a plethora of efforts will be undertaken by primary
producing countries to maximize their own returns on their sales
of primary resources through whatever means are deemed ade-
quate to achieve these ends.252 Cartels among developing States
have already developed for bananas, bauxite, coffee, copper, iron
ore, mercury, phosphates and tin;253 and the United States is
today dependent upon imports for 50 percent or more of its total
requirements of bauxite, chromite, cobalt, manganese, nickel,
platinum, tin and zinc.25 4 The vulnerability of the United States
to economic coercive measures (including embargoes) undertaken
by such cartels is apparent.
Cartelization among Third World States exporting natural
resources vital to the economies of importing nations can be ex-
pected to grow. With its growth, the price increases of essen-
tial raw materials will have inflationary repercussions upon an al-
ready weakened world monetary system. Organized blocs of
exporting States, although militarily impotent, will learn that they
can nevertheless wage a significant amount of economic coercive
warfare against importing States to achieve whatever political or
economic ends from their customers that they desire.2 s  In
particular, the effectiveness of their employment of economic
means in the acquisition of wealth by increasing artificially the
cost of their resources can be expected to grow as they become
more experienced and proficient in the manipulation of their col-
251 Supra note 236, at 16.
252 See Note, International Commodity Agreements, 6 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 275 (1976).
253 Bergsten, Resource Scarcity: Cartelization and Contrived Shortages, 24 AM.
U. L. REV. 1128 (1975). See also Ford's "Common Sense" Program for 1976,
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 2, 1976, at 59.
25 Weintraub, The Example of OPEC and the Possibility of Other Producer
Cartels, 24 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1975).
251 Their success, of course, will depend upon the degree to which the im-
porting state is addicted to the involved commodity.
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lective economic tools. Only the self-sufficient States, or those
States themselves exporting a substantial volume of raw materials
or manufactured goods, can avoid the incremental effects of a
balance-of-payments deficit. The cost increases will not be lim-
ited in their effect to the industrialized States. Indeed, importing
nations of the Fourth World may well suffer relatively more in-
tense degrees of economic deprivation than industrialized nations,
which appear more capable of successfully withstanding the
shock of increased prices.

